Probabilistic reasoning in obsessive–compulsive and 
delusional disorders

Fear, Christopher; Healy, David

doi:10.1017/s0033291796004175

Cited by 163 publications

(132 citation statements)

References 14 publications

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“…For part 2 of the beads task, certainty percentages were collected for each bead, as in Fear and Healy (1997). This yielded four measures: Max1, Max2, Jar Change, and Beads to Change (BTC).…”

Section: Beads Taskmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Indeed, delusional schizophrenia patients were more likely than nondelusional psychiatric controls and non-patients to reduce their level of certainty when presented with disconfirmatory evidence. Other studies did not find differences between the way delusional and control groups reacted to disconfirmatory evidence (Dudley et al, 1997;Fear and Healy, 1997;Young and Bentall, 1997;Peters and Garety, 2006). One study in healthy participant found that people with high scores of delusional ideation were also more reactive to a piece of disconfirmatory evidence than people with low scores (Colbert and Peters, 2002).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 97%

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Healthy people with delusional ideation change their mind with conviction

Rodier

Prévost

Renoult

et al. 2011

Psychiatry Research

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Emotional distress and reasoning biases are two factors known to contribute to delusions. As a step towards elucidating mechanisms underlying delusions, the main aim of this study was to evaluate a possible "jumping to new conclusions" reasoning bias in healthy people with delusional ideation and its association with emotions. We surveyed 80 healthy participants, measuring levels of depression, anxiety, cognitive error and delusional ideation. Participants completed two versions of the beads task to evaluate their reasoning style. Results showed that people with delusional ideation reached a conclusion after less information, as expected. Interestingly, they also tended to change their conclusions more often than people without delusional ideation and did so with greater conviction. Depression and cognitive errors were strong predictors of delusional ideation but not of reasoning style. We conclude that delusional ideation in non-psychotic individuals is independently predicted by depressive symptoms and by a high conviction in new conclusions.

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Section: Beads Taskmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 97%

Healthy people with delusional ideation change their mind with conviction

Rodier

Prévost

Renoult

et al. 2011

Psychiatry Research

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show abstract

“…A more likely explanation of reduced sensitivity to diversity in the OCD-high group relates to preservative tendencies observed in other studies of probabilistic and inductive reasoning in OCD patients (e.g. Fear & Healy, 1997;Volans, 1976). Such studies have found that when asked to evaluate evidence for an uncertain conclusion, people with OCD-related traits often repeatedly choose to examine similar or redundant types of evidence.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 88%

“…However, if inductive reasoning is impaired in people with OCD, then we would expect to see less evidence of the diversity heuristic in those with OCD symptoms. Indirect support for this prediction comes from the finding that relative to controls, individuals with OCD often make repeated observations of the same or similar items before making a probability judgment (e.g., Fear & Healy, 1997;Volans, 1976). As shown in Table 2, the prediction about differences between diversity-based reasoning in those low or high in OCD traits was examined using "OCD-neutral" arguments as well as arguments with content relevant to common obsessions (OCD-relevant).…”

Section: ________________ Jill Gets Cleanmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Previous work on inductive reasoning deficits in OCD has blurred this distinction, with some researchers examining induction based on background knowledge (e.g., Pélissier & O'Connor, 2002), while others have examined the use of domain-general heuristics in probabilistic and inductive reasoning (e.g., Fear & Healy, 1997). We sought to clarify the nature of inductive deficits in people with OCD by assessing those with low and high levels of OCDrelated traits on each of these two types of inductive tasks.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Inductive and deductive reasoning in obsessive-compulsive disorder

Liew

Grisham

Hayes

2018

Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry

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This study examined the hypothesis that individuals with obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) show a selective deficit in inductive reasoning but are unimpaired in their ability to make deductive inferences. 100 participants from an analog sample made inductive or deductive inferences about arguments that differed according to causal consistency and validity. They also completed a task examining sensitivity to the implications of diverse evidence in induction. Participants who were high or low on obsessivecompulsive symptoms showed similar patterns of induction based on causal knowledge and similar patterns of deduction. However, those with the highest level of OCD symptoms showed less of a preference for diverse evidence when evaluating inductive arguments, compared to those with the lowest level of symptoms. This difference was found across both OCD-relevant and OCDneutral items, and persisted when the effects of group differences in general ability were controlled. These results indicate that both inductive reasoning based on background knowledge and deductive reasoning are intact in individuals with high OCD-traits but the use of inductive heuristics such as evidence diversity is impaired.

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People with delusions jump to conclusions: a theoretical account of research findings on the reasoning of people with delusions

Dudley¹,

Over

2003

Clin Psychology and Psychoth

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Recent multifactorial models of psychotic symptoms such as delusions emphasize a role for reasoning biases in the maintenance of delusional beliefs. Specifically, people with delusions are seen to jump to conclusions. This well‐replicated experimental finding has received little in the way of theoretical explanation. In this paper we review this and other research findings examining reasoning of people with delusions and account for these findings by drawing on a model of reasoning. This theoretical integration helps understand the tendency of people with delusions to exhibit this reasoning style. Specifically, we propose that people without delusions demonstrate a normal tendency to confirm danger‐related conditional statements and that people with delusions perceive danger and threat where others do not. Hence, this normal reasoning style is extended to non‐threatening situations. The theoretical and clinical implications are discussed. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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Probabilistic reasoning in obsessive–compulsive and delusional disorders

Cited by 163 publications

References 14 publications

Healthy people with delusional ideation change their mind with conviction

Healthy people with delusional ideation change their mind with conviction

Inductive and deductive reasoning in obsessive-compulsive disorder

People with delusions jump to conclusions: a theoretical account of research findings on the reasoning of people with delusions

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