Probabilistic Tit-for-Tat Strategy versus Nash Equilibrium for Infinitely Repeated Games

Madhumidha, K; Vijayarangan, Natarajan; Padmanabhan, K. A.; Satish, B; Kartick, N; Ganesan, Viswanath

doi:10.1109/csci.2017.26

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2020

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“…In Madhumidha et al [26], various case studies proved that Nash equilibrium does not yield an optimal solution for repeated games.…”

Section: Tft Strategy Ideamentioning

confidence: 99%

Secure Communications by Tit-for-Tat Strategy in Vehicular Networks

Mostefa¹,

Maaza²,

Duvallet³

2020

IJNDC

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Secure communication is one of the main challenges of ad hoc Vehicle Networks (VANET). Intrusion detection of malicious nodes is one of the solutions to secure communication in VANETs using hybrid architecture (V2V and V2I). This article proposes an approach based on game theory, in particular the "Tit-for-Tat" (TfT) strategy as a suitable paradigm for human cooperation in order to detect malicious nodes in passive and active attacks. This article analyzes the performance of the proposed approach and the "TfT" strategy contribution in VANET security.

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“…In Madhumidha et al [26], various case studies proved that Nash equilibrium does not yield an optimal solution for repeated games.…”

Section: Tft Strategy Ideamentioning

confidence: 99%