2012
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-29113-5_4
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Probing Attacks on Multi-Agent Systems Using Electronic Institutions

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Cited by 2 publications
(5 citation statements)
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“…The adversary can subvert this process and actively probe the agents by accessing the victim agent's private local knowledge ( e.g., decision rules and policies) and injecting facts into the agent's knowledge base, asking queries, and evaluating results. Other probing attacks have also been explored in recent research [14]- [16]. In particular, Bijani et al [14] demonstrated four probing attacks on MASs controlled by electronic institutions: explicit query, implicit query, injection, and indirect query attacks.…”
Section: A Attack Operation Disclosure Attacksmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…The adversary can subvert this process and actively probe the agents by accessing the victim agent's private local knowledge ( e.g., decision rules and policies) and injecting facts into the agent's knowledge base, asking queries, and evaluating results. Other probing attacks have also been explored in recent research [14]- [16]. In particular, Bijani et al [14] demonstrated four probing attacks on MASs controlled by electronic institutions: explicit query, implicit query, injection, and indirect query attacks.…”
Section: A Attack Operation Disclosure Attacksmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Other probing attacks have also been explored in recent research [14]- [16]. In particular, Bijani et al [14] demonstrated four probing attacks on MASs controlled by electronic institutions: explicit query, implicit query, injection, and indirect query attacks. These attacks utilize Lightweight Coordination Calculus interaction models.…”
Section: A Attack Operation Disclosure Attacksmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…Having defined a type system for a class of security properties, our purpose in this section is to prove key security properties of the system. Other work (S. Bijani 2013) gives empirical examples of the consequences of these properties in specific interactions but, to save space, we focus here on generic properties across all appropriate LCC interactions.…”
Section: Key Properties Of the Type Systemmentioning
confidence: 99%