Probing Possibilities: Toy Models, Minimal Models, and Exploratory Models

Gelfert, Axel

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-32722-4_1

Cited by 13 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 18 publications

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“…This is certainly true, but there is no question that models are also used for the purpose of acquiring modal knowledge, including about de re possibilities known to be (currently) non-actual. In recent years, a large number of philosophers of science have highlighted modelling practices that aim at drawing modal conclusions, often accompanied by detailed case studies (e.g., Batterman & Rice 2014;Gelfert 2019;Grüne-Yanoff 2013;Massimi 2019;Reutlinger et al 2018;Rice 2019;Verreault-Julien 2019;Weisberg 2013: ch. 7).…”

Section: The Challenge From Modal Modellingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Extending Similarity-Based Epistemology of Modality with Models

Wirling

2022

Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

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Empiricist modal epistemologies can be attractive, but are often limited in the range of modal knowledge they manage to secure. In this paper, I argue that one such account—similarity-based modal empiricism—can be extended to also cover justification of many scientifically interesting possibility claims. Drawing on recent work on modelling in the philosophy of science, I suggest that scientific modelling is usefully seen as the creation and investigation of relevantly similar epistemic counterparts of real target systems. On the basis of experiential knowledge of what is actually the case with the models, one can draw justified conclusions about what is de re possible for the target systems.

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Section: The Challenge From Modal Modellingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Extending Similarity-Based Epistemology of Modality with Models

Wirling

2022

Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

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“…The existing literature focuses primarily on documentation and analysis of specific modeling practices, although some overviews have been attempted (e.g. Gelfert, 2019). But it has not been much discussed under what conditions , and in virtue of what , scientific models can perform the epistemic function—helping to uncover modal information—that is ascribed to them.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The epistemology of modal modeling

Wirling

Grüne‐Yanoff

2021

Philosophy Compass

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Philosophers of science have recently taken care to highlight different modeling practices where scientific models primarily contribute modal information, in the form of for example possibility claims, how‐possibly explanations, or counterfactual conditionals. While examples abound, comparatively little attention is being paid to the question of under what conditions, and in virtue of what, models can perform this epistemic function. In this paper, we firstly delineate modal modeling from other modeling practices, and secondly review attempts to spell out and explain the epistemic success conditions of modal modeling. The aim is to more clearly expose the respective justificatory strategies of these accounts, and secondly, to identify lacunae where further work is needed.

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