Problems of Seismic Acquisitions in the Conditions of the Eastern Ciscaucasia

Губарев, М В; Proshlyakov, S.

doi:10.3997/2214-4609.20140210

Cited by 1 publication

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“…Without authoritative leaders, the pro-Russian secessionists desperately needed a boost from an external actor. Gubarev admitted that in early March 2014, his militant group consisted of no more than twenty members (Gubarev, 2016, 108).…”

Section: (No) Insurgent Violence As An Outcomementioning

confidence: 99%

“…On April 6, 2014, mobs in Donetsk and Luhansk seized state administrative buildings, but their enthusiasm began to crumble, not knowing what to do next. No one was ready for actual fighting (Gubarev 2016, 161; Zhuchkovskiy 2018). The militants, a chaotic network of several dozen uncoordinated people in a city with one million inhabitants, had no leadership.…”

Section: (No) Insurgent Violence As An Outcomementioning

confidence: 99%

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Failing to Fight for the “Russian World”: Pre-War Social Origins of the Pro-Russian Secessionist Organizations in Ukraine

Laryš

2022

Nationalities Papers

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The existing literature explains the war in Donbas and the rationale for why conflict broke out there while failing to do so in other Ukrainian provinces, such as Odesa or Kharkiv. Local pro-Russian organizations could not attract considerable attention and support in the pre-war period in all parts of Ukraine, except for Crimea. The social marginalization and negligible influence of the pro-Russian organizations among the locals presumably stemmed from their weak social ties among the local population. The question is why they had such weak social embeddedness in the local societies despite relatively popular pro-Russian sympathies in these regions? Surprisingly, nobody has sought to explain the social origins of the pro-Russian movements as a source of their weakness and failure to be sparked by the anti-Ukrainian rebellion in 2014.

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Section: (No) Insurgent Violence As An Outcomementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: (No) Insurgent Violence As An Outcomementioning

confidence: 99%