2009
DOI: 10.1080/14623520802703582
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Procedural due process and the prosecution of genocide suspects in Rwanda

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Cited by 26 publications
(7 citation statements)
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“…Even if the Rwandan government has made reconciliation and the elimination of ethnicity a central policy, its stated aim blatantly contradicts its nepotistic style of politics. The contradiction reinforces mistrust and division along ethnic lines, some observers note, and dampens expectations of reaching justice, whether trials are international or domestic (Apuuli 2009;McLean Hilker 2009). 4 Cambodia represents an extremely elitistic case where only a handful of (possible) Khmer Rouge leaders are prosecuted by the tribunal of the Extraordinary Chambers of the Courts of Cambodia (ECCE) tribunal.…”
Section: Localizing Reconciliationmentioning
confidence: 94%
“…Even if the Rwandan government has made reconciliation and the elimination of ethnicity a central policy, its stated aim blatantly contradicts its nepotistic style of politics. The contradiction reinforces mistrust and division along ethnic lines, some observers note, and dampens expectations of reaching justice, whether trials are international or domestic (Apuuli 2009;McLean Hilker 2009). 4 Cambodia represents an extremely elitistic case where only a handful of (possible) Khmer Rouge leaders are prosecuted by the tribunal of the Extraordinary Chambers of the Courts of Cambodia (ECCE) tribunal.…”
Section: Localizing Reconciliationmentioning
confidence: 94%
“…Producing Expertise in a Transitional Justice Setting 85 2005; Waldorf 2006;Apuuli 2009). Others have argued that the gacaca courts were too tightly tied to the state and have thus suggested that they functioned as a form of state power, emphasizing some crimes at the expense of others (Burnet 2008;Rettig 2008;Thomson 2011;Chakravarty 2015).…”
Section: Rwanda's Gacaca Courts and The Inyangamugayomentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Beyond documenting the process and objectives of the gacaca , scholars have assessed Rwandan public opinion of the courts, with many finding generally favorable public sentiment (Gasibirege & Babalola, 2001; Longman, Pham, & Weinstein, 2004; Rettig, 2008). 9 The courts have also sustained harsh criticism, however, as scholars and practitioners have critiqued the implementation of gacaca and the institution more generally (Apuuli, 2009; Fierens, 2005; Ingelaere, 2009; Rettig, 2008; Staub, 2004; Waldorf, 2006). These commentaries address a range of gacaca processes, including but not limited to the traumatic effects of testifying, the retroactive application of laws, the lack of due process rights for the accused, the reduced role of local communities in the creation of the courts, the inclusion of crimes against property, and the lack of trials against members of the RPF, the ruling party who assumed power after the genocide and who were accused of committing crimes in the process of stopping the genocide and in its immediate aftermath.…”
Section: Rwanda’s Response: the Gacaca Courtsmentioning
confidence: 99%