Procedural Mechanisms and Jury Behavior

Tindale, R. Scott; Nadler, Janice; Krebel, Andrea; Davis, James H.

doi:10.1002/9780470998458.ch24

Cited by 12 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 74 publications

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“…Although Laughlin's work (1980;Laughlin & Ellis, 1986) is probably the strongest example of the effects of shared representations, a number of other potent examples exist. For example, much of the work on mock-jury decision making (MacCoun & Kerr, 1988;Tindale, Nadler, Krebel, & Davis, 2001) has shown that "not guilty" is an easier verdict to defend than "guilty." In other words, majorities favoring guilty are less successful than are majorities favoring not guilty.…”

Section: Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Learning While Deciding in Groups

Tindale¹,

Winget²

2019

Preprint

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Groups are used to make many important societal decisions. Similar to individuals, by paying attention to the information available during the decision processes and the consequences of the decisions, groups can learn from their decisions as well. In addition, group members can learn from each other by exchanging information and being exposed to different perspectives. However, groups make decisions in many different ways and the potential and actual learning that takes place will vary as a function of the manner in which groups reach consensus. This chapter reviews the literature on group decision making with a special emphasis on how and when group decision making leads to learning. We argue that learning is possible in virtually any group decision making environment but freely interacting groups create the greatest potential for learning. We also discuss when and why group may not always take advantage of the learning potential.

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Section: Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Learning While Deciding in Groups

Tindale¹,

Winget²

2019

Preprint

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“…It was Jim Davis who, to our knowledge, first speculated about the possibility of a leniency asymmetry in juries (e.g., Davis, 1973; Davis, Kerr, Atkin, Holt, & Meek, 1975); he referred to it as a defendant protection norm . Further, his early jury experiments provided an empirical foundation for not only this phenomenon, but many other interesting jury phenomena (see Stasser, Kerr, & Davis, 1989; Tindale, Nadler, Krebel, & Davis, 2001 for a partial review). In short, the present paper could not have been conceived, let alone written, without the many conceptual, methodological, and empirical contributions Jim Davis made to the study of group behavior.…”

Section: What Would the Absense Of A Leniency Asymmetry Imply About Actual Trials?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Is the leniency asymmetry really dead? Misinterpreting asymmetry effects in criminal jury deliberation

Kerr

MacCoun²

2012

Group Processes & Intergroup Relations

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Early jury simulation research, reviewed and meta-anyalysed by MacCoun and Kerr (1988), suggested a leniency asymmetry in criminal jury deliberations such that a given faction favoring acquittal will tend to have a greater chance of prevailing than would an equivalent sized faction favoring conviction. More recently, a handful of field studies of actual juries have reported either no such leniency asymmetry or one in the opposite direction (a severity asymmetry). A potential bias in the coding of these field studies' data is identified, one that would tend to underestimate any leniency asymmetry. The data from three field studies are re-analyzed after correcting this purported coding bias. The results of these reanalyses show a leniency asymmetry effect, although one that is less pronounced than observed in mock jury studies. It is argued that this difference in degree (not existence) of leniency asymmetry can plausibly be attributed to greater imbalance in evidence strength in the typical actual trial relative to the typical stimulus case in simulation experiments. It is also noted that failure to observe such a leniency asymmetry effect in actual juries would raise important questions about their adherence to the reasonable doubt standard of proof.

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“…Real deliberation is a complex social process (Stasser and Dietz-Uhler 2001; Tindale et al . 2001; Kohn et al . 2011; Levine and Smith 2013; Witte and Davis 2014; Levine and Tindale 2015), though other attempts to model deliberative group dynamics do often model it in terms of either simple preference or judgment aggregation (Austen-Smith and Feddersen 2005, 2006; Landa and Meirowitz 2009; Mathis 2011; Perote-Peña and Piggins 2015; Dietrich et al .…”

Section: Collaborative Search and The Hong–page Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Stasser and Dietz-Uhler 2001;Tindale et al 2001;Kohn et al 2011; Levine and Smith 2013; Witte and Davis 2014; Levine and Tindale 2015), though other attempts to model deliberative group dynamics do often model it in terms of either simple preference or judgment aggregation (Austen-Smith and Feddersen 2005, 2006; Landa and Meirowitz 2009; Mathis 2011; Perote-Peña and Piggins 2015; Dietrich et al 2016; see List 2018). 7 The Hong-Page model has the virtue of capturing that aspect of democratic deliberation represented by collaborative information-sharing with an eye to the exploration of alternatives.…”

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confidence: 99%

Representation in Models of Epistemic Democracy

Grim¹,

Bramson²,

Singer³

et al. 2018

Episteme

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Epistemic justifications for democracy have been offered in terms of two different forms of information aggregation and decision-making. The Condorcet Jury Theorem is appealed to as a justification in terms of votes, and the Hong–Page ‘diversity trumps ability’ result is appealed to as a justification in terms of deliberation in the form of collaborative search. Both results, however, are models of full and direct participation across a population. In this paper, we contrast how these results hold up within the familiar structure of a representative hierarchy. We first consider extant analytic work that shows that representation inevitably weakens the voting results of the Condorcet Jury Theorem. We then go on to show that collaborative search, as modeled by Hong and Page, holds its own within hierarchical representation. In a variation on the dynamics of group search, representation even shows a slight edge over direct participation. This contrast illustrates how models of information aggregation vary when put into a representative structure. While some of the epistemic merits of democracy are lost when voting is done hierarchically, modeling results show that representation can preserve and even slightly amplify the epistemic virtues of collaborative search.

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Procedural Mechanisms and Jury Behavior

Cited by 12 publications

References 74 publications

Learning While Deciding in Groups

Learning While Deciding in Groups

Is the leniency asymmetry really dead? Misinterpreting asymmetry effects in criminal jury deliberation

Representation in Models of Epistemic Democracy

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