Processing False Beliefs in Preschool Children and Adults: Developing a Set of Custom Tasks to Test the Theory of Mind in Neuroimaging and Behavioral Research

Wysocka, Joanna; Golec, Karolina; Haman, Maciej; Wolak, Tomasz; Kochański, Bartosz; Pluta, Agnieszka

doi:10.3389/fnhum.2020.00119

Cited by 7 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 47 publications

(73 reference statements)

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“…A minority of neuroimaging studies presumably included a balanced false versus true belief design (14 in total, or 27.5% of all false belief fMRI studies), which we argue may control for all processes related to mental representation per se. Of those, most reported TPJ activity (Boccadoro et al, 2019; Cracco et al, 2020; Döhnel et al, 2017; Kovács et al, 2014; Nijhof et al, 2018; Özdem, Brass, Van der Cruyssen, & Van Overwalle, 2017; Özdem, Brass, Schippers, Van der Cruyssen, & Van Overwalle, 2019; Rothmayer et al, 2011; Sommer et al, 2018, 2007; Wysocka et al, 2020). The implication is that activity in TPJ-areas within false belief conditions may be tied to a social conflict processing—even for experiments where a balanced true belief condition is not present.…”

Section: Reframing the Interpretation Of Data In The Theory Of Mind D...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Reframing social cognition: Relational versus representational mentalizing.

Deschrijver¹,

Palmer²

2020

Psychological Bulletin

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The most dominant theory of human social cognition, the theory of mind hypothesis, emphasizes our ability to infer the mental states of others. After having represented the mental states of another person, however, we can also have an idea of how well our thinking aligns with theirs, and our sensitivity to this alignment may guide the flow of our social interactions. Here, we focus on the distinction between “mindreading” (inferring another’s mental representation) and detecting the extent to which a represented mental state of another person is matching or mismatching with our own (mental conflict monitoring). We propose a reframing for mentalizing data of the past 40 years in terms of mental conflict monitoring rather than mental representation. Via a systematic review of 51 false belief neuroimaging studies, we argue that key brain regions implicated in false belief designs (namely, temporoparietal junction areas) may methodologically be tied to mental conflict rather than to mental representation. Patterns of false belief data suggests that autism may be tied to a subtle issue with monitoring mental conflict combined with intact mental representation, rather than to lacking mental representation abilities or “mindblindness” altogether. The consequences of this view for the larger social–cognitive domain are explored, including for perspective taking, moral judgments, and understanding irony and humor. This provides a potential shift in perspective for psychological science, its neuroscientific bases, and related disciplines: Throughout life, an adequate sensitivity to how others think differently (relational mentalizing) may be more fundamental to navigating the social world than inferring which thoughts others have (representational mentalizing).

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Section: Reframing the Interpretation Of Data In The Theory Of Mind D...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Reframing social cognition: Relational versus representational mentalizing.

Deschrijver¹,

Palmer²

2020

Psychological Bulletin

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“…The right TPJ is involved in a variety of social cognitive processes, including joint attention ( Mundy, 2018 ; Saxe, 2010 ) and mentalizing ( Frith & Frith, 2003 ; Krall et al, 2015 ). fNIRS studies conducted with NT infants, children, and adults have documented right TPJ activation during in-person joint attention tasks ( Dravida et al, 2020 ; Hakuno et al, 2018 ) and computer-based mentalizing tasks (e.g., false belief tasks; Hyde et al, 2018 ; Wysocka et al, 2020 ). Given the role that the right TPJ plays in these social cognitive processes, our findings suggest that NT children may have been engaged in joint attention and/or mentalizing to a greater extent during the live language condition than the recorded language condition.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Neural Bases of Language Processing During Social and Non-Social Contexts: A fNIRS Study of Autistic and Neurotypical Preschool-Aged Children

Pecukonis,

Gerson,

Gustafson-Alm

et al. 2024

Preprint

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Background: Little is known about how the brains of autistic children process language during real-world “social contexts,” despite the fact that challenges with language, communication, and social interaction are core features of Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD). Methods: We investigated the neural bases of language processing during social and non-social contexts in a sample of N=20 autistic and N=20 neurotypical (NT) preschool-aged children, 3 to 6 years old. Functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS) was used to measure children’s brain response to “live language” spoken by a live experimenter during an in-person social context (i.e., book reading), and “recorded language” played via an audio recording during a non-social context (i.e., screen time). We examined within-group and between-group differences in the strength and localization of brain response to live language and recorded language, as well as correlations between children’s brain response and language skills measured by the Preschool Language Scales. Results: In the NT group, brain response to live language was greater than brain response to recorded language in the right temporal parietal junction (TPJ). In the ASD group, the strength of brain response did not differ between conditions. The ASD group showed greater brain response to recorded language than the NT group in the right inferior and middle frontal gyrus (IMFG). Across groups, children’s language skills were negatively associated with brain response to recorded language in the right IMFG, suggesting that processing recorded language required more cognitive effort for children with lower language skills. Children’s language skills were also positively associated with the difference in brain response between conditions in the right TPJ, demonstrating that children who showed a greater difference in brain response to live language versus recorded language had higher language skills. Limitations: Findings should be considered preliminary until they are replicated in a larger sample. Conclusions: Findings suggest that the brains of NT children, but not autistic children, process language differently during social and non-social contexts. Individual differences in how the brain processes language during social and non-social contexts may help to explain why language skills are so variable across children with and without autism.

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“…As a result, participants did not need to switch between the perspective of various characters while simultaneously inhibiting their own perspective. This ToM task was previously used with a sample of children with typical levels of hearing and has been demonstrated to be valid for the assessment of ToM development ( Wysocka et al., 2020 ).…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The ToM task was preceded by a short training (described in detail in Wysocka et al., 2020 ) in order to familiarize the children with the experimental situation and to ensure that they understood the task and the two prerecorded questions.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…A major change in FBT performance occurs between the ages of 3 and 5 years ( Blijd-Hoogewys & van Geert, 2017 ; Liu et al., 2008 ; Perner & Roessler, 2012 ; for a meta-analysis on false beliefs, see Wellman et al., 2001 ). Previous studies have shown that typically developing 3-year-olds fail FBTs, while almost half of 4-year-olds and a majority of 5-year-olds are able to appreciate that the character holds a false belief and provide a correct answer ( Wellman et al., 2001 ; Wysocka et al., 2020 ). Beyond this age, children begin to understand second-order false beliefs (“A thinks that B thinks X”; Beaudoin et al., 2020 ).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

False Belief Understanding in Deaf Children With Cochlear Implants

Pluta

Krysztofiak

Zgoda

et al. 2021

The Journal of Deaf Studies and Deaf Education

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Theory of mind (ToM) is crucial for social interactions. Previous research has indicated that deaf and hard-of-hearing children born into hearing families (DoH) are at risk of delayed ToM development. However, it is unclear whether this is the case for DoH children who receive cochlear implants (CIs) before and around the second year of life. The present study aimed to investigate false belief understanding (FBU) in DoH children with CIs. The relationships between false belief task (FBT) performance, sentence comprehension, age at implantation, duration of CI use, and Speech Recognition Threshold were explored. A total of 94 children with typical levels of hearing (TH) and 45 DoH children (age range: 3–8), who received their first CI between 6 and 27 months of age, were tested on the FBT and a sentence comprehension test. Results showed that 4- and 5-year-old children with CIs performed significantly worse than their peers with TH on the FBT; 6- to 8-year-old children with CIs performed similarly to age-matched children with TH. Age at implantation and duration of CI use were correlated with sentence comprehension but not with the FBT. The results indicated that FBU was delayed until the age of 6 years in most of children with CIs.

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Processing False Beliefs in Preschool Children and Adults: Developing a Set of Custom Tasks to Test the Theory of Mind in Neuroimaging and Behavioral Research

Cited by 7 publications

References 47 publications

Reframing social cognition: Relational versus representational mentalizing.

Reframing social cognition: Relational versus representational mentalizing.

The Neural Bases of Language Processing During Social and Non-Social Contexts: A fNIRS Study of Autistic and Neurotypical Preschool-Aged Children

False Belief Understanding in Deaf Children With Cochlear Implants

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