Procuring Knowledge

Maurer, Stephen M.; Scotchmer, Suzanne

doi:10.3386/w9903

Cited by 21 publications

(31 citation statements)

References 4 publications

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“…Matching grants, and other cost-sharing programs, are commonly used by federal agencies in the U.S. 36 Our results suggest that such schemes may be particularly effective in dealing with AS. Maurer and Scotchmer (2003) also point out that a matching grant can be an effective screening device in the presence of AS. Our results reveal the conditions under which this is in fact the optimal means of screening in a setting where MH is also relevant.…”

Section: Design Of Push Programs: Randd Tax Credits and Matching Grantsmentioning

confidence: 93%

“…Further, we connect our results to the U.S. R&D tax credit system, and comment on its design. Maurer and Scotchmer (2003) argue that repeated interaction between grantees and grantors resolves the MH problem. Our explanation for how a push program might overcome MH complements their's, as it is relevant in a static setting.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“… See Hall (2007) for an overview. 13 SeeMaurer and Scotchmer (2003) for an overview. 14 See, e.g Prendergast (1999Prendergast ( , 2002.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Push or Pull? Performance-Pay, Incentives, and Information

Rietzke

Chen

2019

SSRN Journal

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We study a principal-agent model wherein the agent is better informed of the prospects of the project, and the project requires both an observable and unobservable input. We show (1) Performance pay may not be optimal, even if output is the only informative signal of an essential input; (2) Total surplus tends to be higher if one input is unobservable than if both inputs are observable; and (3) Bunching may arise amongst low and intermediate types. We explore the implications for push and pull programs used to encourage R&D activity, but our results have applications beyond this context.

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Section: Design Of Push Programs: Randd Tax Credits and Matching Grantsmentioning

confidence: 93%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Push or Pull? Performance-Pay, Incentives, and Information

Rietzke

Chen

2019

SSRN Journal

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“…An idea is interpreted as a practical solution to a need that is common knowledge among the firms in the industry, and which defines a market where innovators compete. See Maurer and Scotchmer () for a discussion of the difference between this environment and those where ideas address a need that had not been identified.…”

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confidence: 99%

Information Acquisition and Innovation under Competitive Pressure

Barbos

2015

Economics Manag Strategy

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This paper studies information acquisition under competitive pressure and proposes a model to examine the relationship between product market competition and the level of innovative activity in an industry. Recent empirical papers point to an inverted-U shape relationship between competition and innovation. Our paper o¤ers theoretical support to these results while employing a more accurate de…nition of innovation than the previous literature; more precisely, we isolate innovation from riskless technological progress. The …rms in our model learn of an invention and decide on whether and when to innovate. In making this decision, …rms face a trade-o¤ between seeking a …rst-mover advantage and waiting to acquire more information. By recognizing that a …rm can intensify its innovative activity on two dimensions, a temporal and a quantitative one, we show that …rms solve this trade-o¤ precisely so as to generate the inverted-U shape relationship. When the competition in the pre innovation market is su¢ ciently high, the level of competition in the post innovation market is endogenous. We investigate the welfare e¤ects of innovation under competitive pressure and …nd conditions that determine the socially optimal level of competition. We study the e¤ects that the degree of technological spread in the industry has on innovation and highlight the roles that strategic uncertainty and the discreteness of the information acquisition process play in this context. JEL Clasi¢ cation: D40, L10

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“… See Scotchmer (2004) for a discussion of contests for sponsored research. The more knowledge the planner has about what the target of research should be, its value, or its cost the wider the set of alternative instruments to patents Maurer and Scotchmer (2004). discuss a variety of procurement mechanisms, including auctions, prototype contests , grants, and matching funds Trajtenberg (2002).…”

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confidence: 99%

Property Rights and Invention

Rockett

2010

Handbook of the Economics of Innovation

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Draft chapter 7 for Handbook of Economics and Technical Change, Bronwyn Hall and Nathan Rosenberg, Editors. This chapter was partially sponsored by "The Knowledge-Based Society", Research Council of Norway project 172603/V10. 1 A more complete description of the patent right, including its history, can be found in Scotchmer (2004), Guellec and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2007), and Jaffe and Lerner (2006). 2 See Guellec and van Pottelsberghe (2007) and Jaffe and Lerner (2006) for more detailed discussion of the philosophical differences between European and US views of patents. For an argument for a constitutional underpinning of patent rights, see Nard and Morriss (2006). 11 See Anand and Khanna (2000) for observed license contract structure. 12 See Jaffe and Lerner (2006), especially pp. 82-94. 19 This may be done in order to obtain several chances at obtaining a valid national patent. As the EPO tends to produce feedback on the patentability of the innovation slowly compared to national offices or the US, this strategy also has the advantage of providing valuable early feedback to the applicant as to whether the application is worthwhile to pursue. Furthermore, as the USPTO allows more substantial changes to be introduced to the patent document after filing, it may make sense to file at the USPTO early and then file a better-crafted document at the EPO later. See Guellec and van Pottelsberghe (2007), p. 155-159, for patent filing routes. 20 Other possible outcomes, which differ between the US and Europe, include withdrawal or revision of the document. See Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe (2007) or Jaffe and Lerner (2006) for details. 21 See http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/speeches/07-46.htm for example. From this press release, it is clear that there is considerable variance across years included in this figure. See also Harhoff and Wagner (2005). Ebert (2004), commenting on the role of patent continuations in the US system, obtains a somewhat lower adjusted rejection rate of ¼. 22 See Bessen and Meurer (2008a) for estimates. 23 Lerner (1995) estimates that cases begun in 1991 in the US would eventually total legal expenditures, in 1991 dollars, of about 27% of all of the basic research expenditure in the US in 1991. 24 See Lanjouw and Schankerman (2001), and Lemley (2001). In other words, about 95% of litigated patents settle out of court. 35 A simple example t keep in mind for later parts of the chapter could be strict enforcement of EU Article 82(a), which forbids "excessive pricing" by a dominant firm. 49 Empirical investigation raises the issue of simultaneity between research intensity and intellectual property protection. Studies controlling for this link (see Qian (2007)), however, continue to find relatively little evidence of a relation between strength of protection and investment activity. 50 In the earlier notation, if welfare equals d+s+π per period, as before, society obtains only s+π during the period of protection, but the entire welfare triangle after the patent expires.

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Procuring Knowledge

Cited by 21 publications

References 4 publications

Push or Pull? Performance-Pay, Incentives, and Information

Push or Pull? Performance-Pay, Incentives, and Information

Information Acquisition and Innovation under Competitive Pressure

Property Rights and Invention

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