2022
DOI: 10.1016/j.ribaf.2022.101786
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Product market competition and stock price crash risk: Exploring the role of managerial ownership

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Cited by 6 publications
(4 citation statements)
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“…Market competition. Following existing literature, this study quantifies market competition intensity through the absolute value of the Herfindahl Index’s logarithm [ 60 ].…”
Section: Methodsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Market competition. Following existing literature, this study quantifies market competition intensity through the absolute value of the Herfindahl Index’s logarithm [ 60 ].…”
Section: Methodsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Granting directors and other members of management a designated number of shares presents an efficacious remedy for the agency problem ( Shan et al, 2019 ). Managerial shareholding confers upon management a residual claim, facilitating the alignment of residual control rights and claims within the enterprise, engendering interest convergence effects, fostering close integration of managerial interests with long-term enterprise development, and effectively mitigating managers’ opportunistic tendencies ( Jensen and Meckling, 1976 ; Chen, 2005 ; Benkraiem et al, 2022 ). Managerial ownership can transform external supervision into a self-incentive and constraint, thereby serving as an essential alternative mechanism in cases where the existing supervision mechanism fails.…”
Section: Theoretical Analysis and Hypothesis Developmentmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Interestingly, research suggests foreign institutional investors from countries with high tax morality and corporate governance quality are negatively associated with corporate tax avoidance (Hasan et al, 2019). We might argue that strong institutional frameworks can constrain corporate tax avoidance by mitigating agency problems, limiting expropriation, and imposing penalties for opportunistic behavior (Benkraiem et al, 2024;Hu et al, 2023). In addition, quality governance likely improves corruption control, which is a key driver of tax evasion (Nimer et al, 2022;Yamen et al, 2018).…”
Section: Policy Uncertainty National Governance Quality and Tax Avoid...mentioning
confidence: 99%