Product pricing problem in green and non-green multi-channel supply chains under government intervention and in the presence of third-party logistics companies

Mahmoudi, Ali; Govindan, Kannan; Shishebori, Davood; Mahmoudi, Reza

doi:10.1016/j.cie.2021.107490

Cited by 46 publications

(20 citation statements)

References 51 publications

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“…If this parameter is positive, it expresses the tax of the government; Otherwise, it means the subsidy. Nevertheless, Mahmoudi et al (2021) characterized the subsidy to green producers and the tax to non-green producers with the positive and negative of a parameter in the profit function. Ma et al (2021) utilized two parameters to express the carbon emission tax rate and subsidy rate respectively.…”

Section: The Government Intervention On Gscsmentioning

confidence: 99%

A game between green and non-green supply chains considering two-way government intervention and manufacturer competition

Shang

Wang

Xia

2022

Front. Environ. Sci.

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Enterprise competition has been transformed into chain-to-chain competition, and green development is imperative under the promotion of policies. Horizontal cooperation between green and non-green manufacturers provides a new direction for the supply chain to improve its core competitiveness. This paper develops competition and cooperation models between two manufacturers for the green and non-green supply chain under two-way government intervention to explore the impact of manufacturers’ horizontal cooperation on decisions and profits of supply chain members. In particular, for a situation without cooperation, we consider a Stackelberg game between two manufacturers. Model solutions and numerical analysis have shown that: 1) Cooperation among manufacturers can not only improve their own profits, but also strengthen environmental welfare. However, cooperation will damage consumer surplus. 2) When consumers are more sensitive to product prices, manufacturers’ cooperative behavior is not conducive to retailers, but with the improvement of consumer environmental awareness, retailers will gradually support their upstream cooperation. 3) Under the simultaneous implementation of government subsidy and punishment strategies, whether green consumption can be promoted is related to the adjustment factor of government subsidies, while the relationship between the green level floor for subsidy and product greenness is affected by the adjustment factor of subsidies and manufacturers’ cooperation. 4) The impacts of fierce price competition and green level competition on supply chain members are opposite; when the price competition is moderate or the green level competition is weak, the manufacturers’ cooperation is also beneficial to the improvement of retailers’ profits. This provides ideas for the development of green supply chain, and provides a reference for the implementation of two-way government intervention policy.

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Section: The Government Intervention On Gscsmentioning

confidence: 99%

A game between green and non-green supply chains considering two-way government intervention and manufacturer competition

Shang

Wang

Xia

2022

Front. Environ. Sci.

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“…A SC can include several suppliers, producers, distributors, central depots, recycling centers, and, finally, customers (Amin & Zhang, 2013). The goal of GSCM is to achieve a stable balance between the profits of chain members and environmental policy (Mahmoudi et al, 2021), while sustainable supply chain management (SSCM) considers social dimensions of activities in addition to environmental and economic aspects (Feng et al, 2021;Mahmoudi et al, 2019). Indeed, the main goal of the SSCM is to strike a suitable balance between economic development, environmental monitoring, and social assets (Sikdar, 2003).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…As the core of a SC, logistics has a significant impact on the efficiency and internal costs of a SC (Li et al, 2012). On the other hand, the delivery of the ordered products to the customers in the fastest possible time is one of the most critical factors that can lead to a significant increase in the loyalty of the consumer toward the producer and distribution channels (Mahmoudi et al, 2021). By outsourcing logistics activities, companies can decrease their operational costs and their financial risk (Aktas & Ulengin, 2005).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Sustainable multi-channel supply chain design: an intuitive fuzzy game theory approach to deal with uncertain business environment

Mahmoudi

Emrouznejad

et al. 2022

Environ Dev Sustain

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By introducing the concept of sustainable development, managers and policymakers in many industries have been encouraged to consider environmental and social issues in addition to economic objectives in their planning. Following this concept, sustainable supply chain management has become the main concern of many studies. Among all the strategies to achieve sustainability targets in a supply chain, cooperating with third-party logistics companies has attracted lots of attention. By providing more sustainable and efficient transportation services, 3PLs can help all types of regular, closed-loop, and circular SCs achieve more profit, while they are still sustainable, at least in distribution and collection/recycling stages. This study investigates the sustainable multi-channel SC design problem in the presence of the government and 3PLs. To bring the present study closer to the real-world situation, the problem is modeled using an intuitionistic fuzzy uncertainty approach. Considering the government as the leader of the SC in two centralized and decentralized decision structures, game theory has been applied to model the game between players and obtain optimal decision values. For the first time in the literature, public awareness toward green activities of the players, emission reduction, uncertainty, and delivery time have been considered in this study. The results show the presence of a 3PL will reduce the delivery time and the amount of pollution. Also, the findings confirm that governments can control the players' activities and encourage them to apply green strategies using financial tools.

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“…The literature review of our research topic includes two parts: competitive and cooperative relationships within 3PLs SCs and RO of mathematical models related to 3PLs. In the first part, Mahmoudi et al ( 2021 ) examined the issue of sustainable supply chain management in the presence of the government through implementing the transportation sector outsourcing strategy to a 3PL. The problem is studied according to different formats of competition and game theory is used to model the problem.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cooperation and coopetition among retailers-third party logistics providers alliances under different risk behaviors, uncertainty demand and environmental considerations

Fallahi

Hafezalkotob

Raissi

et al. 2022

Environ Dev Sustain

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Product pricing problem in green and non-green multi-channel supply chains under government intervention and in the presence of third-party logistics companies

Cited by 46 publications

References 51 publications

A game between green and non-green supply chains considering two-way government intervention and manufacturer competition

A game between green and non-green supply chains considering two-way government intervention and manufacturer competition

Sustainable multi-channel supply chain design: an intuitive fuzzy game theory approach to deal with uncertain business environment

Cooperation and coopetition among retailers-third party logistics providers alliances under different risk behaviors, uncertainty demand and environmental considerations

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