Production Partnerships Formation with Heterogeneous Agents: a Simulation in SWARM

Fiaschi, Davide; Garrido, Nicolás; Pacini, Pier Mario

doi:10.1007/978-1-4615-0785-7_9

Cited by 2 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 10 publications

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“…% converged to SNEI86.80166.00165.00 Table 1: % of simulations converged to SNE 8 Ex ante the relation between AU! and the initial distribution of resources is ambiguous; thus with increasing returns, ceteris paribus, the average utility is a positive function of inequality, but in our economy greater inequality also means a lower incentive to aggregation (it is simpler to coalesce for agents with the same resources) and therefore a lower average utility.…”

Section: Numerical Resultsmentioning

confidence: 96%

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Coalition Formation with Heterogeneous Agents

Fiaschi

Pacini

2001

Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems

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Abstract. The paper analyzes a game of coalition formation in which agents with limited computational abilities possess heterogeneous endowments and seek to coa.-lesce into groups to produce and divide an output. The basic game is modelled as a two stage game; in the first stage every agent sends other agents various messages consisting in the proposal of a coalition. In the second stage, knowing the coalitions, agents choose the actions to perform. We show that there exists at least a Strong Nash equilibrium characterized by the consecutive property, i.e. the richest agents form a coalition among themselves and so do the poorest agents. The numerical simulations show that agents play the SNE with high probability; moreover, the more unequal the initial distribution of resources, the lower the average utility in the economy. The transition paths highlight the fact that the rich agents are the first to coalesce, so that the inequality of individual utilities increases in the early periods and then decreases when poor agents also start coalescing. In contrast, average utility is generally increasing, so that there exists a non linear relationship between inequality and average utility.

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Section: Numerical Resultsmentioning

confidence: 96%

“…In our case the fitness index is the expected utility of a given message as described in § 3.1 and the procedure works in such a manner that the higher is this fitness index, the higher is the probability that the corresponding agent will play the message (see Fiaschi et al (2001) for more details).…”

Section: Artificial Agentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Coalition Formation with Heterogeneous Agents

Fiaschi

Pacini

2001

Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems

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On Coalition Formation with Heterogeneous Agents

Caparrós¹,

Hammoudi

Tazdaït

2004

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in On Coalition Formation with Heterogeneous Agents SummaryWe propose a framework to analyze coalition formation with heterogeneous agents. Existing literature defines stability conditions that do not ensure that, once an agent decides to sign an agreement, the enlarged coalition is feasible. Defining the concepts of refraction and exchanging, we set up conditions of existence and enlargement of a coalition with heterogeneous agents. We use the concept of exchanging agents to give necessary conditions for internal stability and show that refraction is a sufficient condition for the failure of an enlargement of the coalition. With heterogeneous agents we can get a situation where a group of members of an unstable coalition does not deviate, neither within the coalition nor within the extended coalition. Hence, the possibilities of agreement are richer than in the standard analysis with homogeneous agents. Examples of industrial economics are used for illustration, and an application to climate change negotiations is discussed in more detail.

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Production Partnerships Formation with Heterogeneous Agents: a Simulation in SWARM

Cited by 2 publications

References 10 publications

Coalition Formation with Heterogeneous Agents

Coalition Formation with Heterogeneous Agents

On Coalition Formation with Heterogeneous Agents

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