Productivity crowding-out in labor markets with motivated workers

Barigozzi, Francesca; Burani, Nadia; Raggi, Davide

doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2018.03.018

Cited by 21 publications

(14 citation statements)

References 52 publications

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“… Barigozzi et al . () confirm this result in the case of a positive but small statistical association between ability and motivation. Interestingly, they find the opposite result that a pay rise may attract less able and less motivated applicants in the case of strong positive association. …”

supporting

confidence: 71%

Paying Politicians: Not Too Little, Not Too Much

Fedele

Giannoccolo

2019

Economica

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How does pay affect the quality of politicians? This paper addresses the question by considering a three‐period citizen candidate model where potential candidates vary in skills and in public service motivation. First, potential candidates observe the level of pay in politics and simultaneously decide whether or not to run for office. Second, an election takes place and only one candidate is elected. Finally, the successful candidate provides a public good, while the others work in the market sector. In a benchmark model where potential candidates differ only in skills, the quality of the elected politician is shown to increase with pay. If public service motivation is also considered, then an inverted U‐shaped relationship is found.

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supporting

confidence: 71%

Paying Politicians: Not Too Little, Not Too Much

Fedele

Giannoccolo

2019

Economica

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“…7 Barigozzi et al (2014) and Barigozzi and Turati (2012) consider labour supply in a market where the wage rate is flat and where workers have private information about both productive ability and motivation, that follow a general joint distribution.…”

Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Competition and screening with motivated health professionals

Barigozzi

Burani

2016

Journal of Health Economics

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Two hospitals compete for the exclusive services of health professionals, who are privately informed about their ability and motivation. Hospitals differ in their ownership structure and in the mission they pursue. The non-profit hospital sacrifices some profits to follow its mission but becomes attractive for motivated workers. In equilibrium, when both hospitals are active, the sorting of workers to hospitals is efficient and ability-neutral. Allocative distortions are decreasing in the degree of competition and disappear when hospitals are similar. The non-profit hospital tends to provide a higher amount of care and offer lower salaries than the for-profit one.

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“…PSM is, therefore, an important predictor for productivity and service delivery in the public sector (Perry & Vandenabeele, 2015). However, whether higher wages attract workers with lower PSM to civil service depends on the correlation between PSM and productivity (Barigozzi, Burani, & Raggi, 2018). If these are positively (negatively) correlated, financial incentives attract (screen out) individuals with not only high quality but also high PSM.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Can a Higher Wage Attract Better Quality Applicants without Deteriorating Public Service Motivation? Evidence from the Bangladesh Civil Service

Alam

Kijima

2020

International Journal of Public Administration

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Although the civil service plays a critical role in economic development, it performs poorly in many countries, partly due to civil servants' low salaries. Therefore, in 2015, the Bangladesh government doubled the salary of civil servants. However, the reform may worsen public service delivery by attracting those who have lower public service motivation (PSM). Using the data of applicants to the Bangladesh civil service (BCS), this study examines the effect of the 2015 pay-scale reform on PSM. Taking a difference-indifferences approach, this study finds that the BCS officers hired after the reform are both academically smarter and more motivated to public service than those hired before the reform. Our results suggest that salary increases can be an effective for recruiting higher-quality officers.

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Productivity crowding-out in labor markets with motivated workers

Cited by 21 publications

References 52 publications

Paying Politicians: Not Too Little, Not Too Much

Paying Politicians: Not Too Little, Not Too Much

Competition and screening with motivated health professionals

Can a Higher Wage Attract Better Quality Applicants without Deteriorating Public Service Motivation? Evidence from the Bangladesh Civil Service

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