Professionalization and Probity in a Patrimonial State: Labor Inspectors in the Dominican Republic

Abstract

Are international labor rights campaigns making a difference in Latin America? This article reveals that Dominican policymakers and bureaucrats are responding to foreign pressure by redoubling their commitment to a distinctively Franco-Iberian model of labor law enforcement, in which skilled labor inspectors use their discretion to balance society's demand for protection with the economy's need for efficiency. In so doing, they provide an alternative to traditional collective bargaining practices-which at least partly decouples both the intensity of the enforcement effort and the degree of worker protection from the level of unionization-and an example for the rest of the region. The article therefore concludes by reconsidering the Central American experience in light of the Dominican findings and discussing their joint implications for our understanding of administrative reform, industrial relations, and globalization, not only in the so-called CAFTA countries but in Latin America more generally.

U.S. Free Trade Agreements and Enforcement of Labor Law in Latin America

“…This is more specific than the Declaration's reference to "the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation." 6 Rosado Marzán (2010), Schrank (2009), and Velásquez Pinto (2011) also point out that FTAs had positive effects on labor enforcement in Chile, Dominican Republic and El Salvador respectively.…”

“…A number of country studies, some of which were mentioned above, provide qualitative evidence of the effects of US FTAs on enforcement of labor law in several of the signing Latin American countries (Rosado Marzán, 2010;Monroy Gallego, 2012;Schrank, 2009;Toyama Miyagusuku, 2011;Vega Ruiz, 2009;Velásquez Pinto, 2011;Weller, 2011). 9 They all suggest a positive effect though a number of different channels, including an increase in the inspection agency budget, hiring of additional labor inspectors, training of labor inspectors, providing new vehicles and computers, implementing a new case management system, and ending the political appointment process and reclassifying inspectors into the career civil service.…”

Pathways to Enforcement: Labor Inspectors Leveraging Linkages with Society in Argentina

“…Inspectors also serve as gateways to other parts of the state apparatus, bringing cases in courts and referring employers to government services (such as worker training). Due to their key role in strengthening weak institutions, scholars have begun to examine inspectorates in industrializing countries that have high levels of non-compliance (Marshall 2007;Piore and Schrank 2008;Pires 2008;Schrank 2009;Ronconi 2010). These studies have demonstrated that enforcement, when it does occur, can have an impact on labor market outcomes.…”

“…By contrast, cases of successful enforcement in the literature tend to emphasize a set of bureaucratic characteristics that provide the inspectorate with high degrees of internal coherence (c.f. Piore and Schrank 2008;Pires 2008;Schrank 2009). …”

“…For example, in the Dominican Republic all wage and hour inspectors are lawyers and in Brazil all inspectors have college degrees and 34% have graduate degrees (Pires 2008;Schrank 2009). 44 Multiple interviews, including: C38, Inspector, STC, Córdoba, 7/18/2008;C43, Inspector, STC, Córdoba, 6/25/2008 there are no barriers between inspectors and union leaders that prevent regulators from mobilizing specific resources outside of the state.…”