Professionalization and Public Opinion of State Legislatures

Abstract

University ofIowaUsing a seven-state survey I examine how closely people follow the activities of the state legislature, how much contact they have with its members, and how they evaluate its perfonnance. In particular, I investigate whether legislative professionalization level or district size influences how people see their legislature. Professionalization has a positive relationship with contact but has a negative relationship with attention level and perfonnance rating. Constituency size exhibits little influence except on contacts.

Legislators’ Need for Civil Society Expertise: Tunisian Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Opportunity

“…The number of staff has also been shown to shape the policymaking process (Romzek and Utter 1997;Neal 1996) 4 and to improve oversight (Aberbach 1990;Jewell and Whicker 1994). Staffers help legislators to maintain contact with their constituents and assist in addressing the constituents' casework needs and other demands (Squire 1993;Richardson and Freeman 1995;Rosenthal 1986). By taking over casework and other administrative tasks, staff allow legislators more time to invest in policy making.…”

Legislature Size and Non-Elite Populations Theory and Corroborating Evidence

“…smaller legislatures) compromise the quality of the representative/constituent relationship (Lee & Oppenheimer, 1999;Oppenheimer, 1996), which leads to less citizen contact (Hibbing & Alford, 1990), and less popular politicians (Binder, Maltzman, & Sigelman, 1998; on governors see King & Cohen, 2005; on state legislators see Squire, 1993). The U.S. Senate has been a frequent testing ground for work on constituency size because the number of representatives from each of the 50 American states is constant, but populations fluctuate wildly.…”

Do Institutions Really Matter? Assessing the Impact of State Judicial Structures on Citizen Litigiousness

“…First, professionalization indirectly reduces the probability that judges will commit reversible error by increasing the amount of time and resources available for deliberation. Professionalized court systems place heavy emphasis on increasing the amount of time that judges dedicate to service, enhancing the availability and quality of resources provided to those jurists, and formalizing the organizational procedures that govern the institution's decision making processes (Mooney 1995;Squire 1993;Bowman & Kearney 1988;Sharkansky & Hofferbert 1969). Indeed, more professionalized court systems garner a greater percentage of state expenditures for their operating budgets and enjoy a larger number of staff members and professional court administrators than non-professionalized institutions.…”

“…The higher salaries and benefits offered by more professional court systems serve to increase not only recruitment, but also retention of highly proficient judges (Brace and Hall 2001;Berry 1979). Additionally, judges in professionalized court systems feel less political pressure from outside interests, which may eliminate the desire of some judges to exit a highly stressful and politically demanding job (Squire 1993;Abel 1974). As judges remain on the bench for longer periods of time, potential litigants are better able to use past decisions to predict future risks of appearing before a particular jurist.…”

“…Such institutions are also typically subjected to more publicity and scrutiny than less professional institutions. This type of attention serves to enhance the quality of representation and responsiveness to the democratic demands; citizens recognize this responsiveness as an opportunity to access the courts (Squire 1993). The structural characteristics of professionalized judiciaries further lower the costs of access to the court system.…”