Professor Friedman, meet Lady Rhys-Williams: NIT vs. CIT

Kesselman, Jonathan R.; Garfinkel, Irwin

doi:10.1016/0047-2727(78)90035-x

Cited by 29 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…In many simple models, the use of universal bene¢ts can achieve higher social welfare levels, more redistribution and lower poverty levels (despite the so-called target ine¤ciency involved in giving bene¢ts to the non-poor). Examples include studies by Atkinson (1995a), Lambert (1985, 1988, 1997a, Fortin et al (1993), Kesselman and Gar¢nkel (1978) and Sadka et al (1982). In short, these types of model can provide useful insights into interdependencies involved in designing tax structures in the face of incentive and second-best problems.…”

Section: (Iii) Optimal Tax Modelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Tax Modelling

Creedy

2001

Economic Record

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This paper reviews several alternative approaches to tax modelling, emphasizing the strengths and limitations of di¡erent approaches and types of model along with their potential role in rational policy analysis. The coverage is limited to models of personal direct and indirect taxes. A range of small models is considered, in which there is little population heterogeneity, and tax structures are relatively simple. Larger microsimulation models, which are based on crosssectional data sets and which attempt to capture much of the complexity of actual tax structures, are then discussed. The challenge presented by the need for behavioural models is examined. It is argued that there is a role for a variety of alternative models. Policy debates inevitably involve prejudices, much rhetoric and special pleading. Rational policy analysis, in which the implications of adopting a range of explicit value judgements are examined, can make a valuable contribution to such debates.

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Section: (Iii) Optimal Tax Modelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Tax Modelling

Creedy

2001

Economic Record

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“…Such a view demarcates between citizens and has attracted the attention of economists and tax policy-makers. In the view of Kesselman and Garfinkel [30], credit tax-scheme analysis opposes the income-tested program in the rich and the poor, also known as two-man economy. Poverty measurements have also been addressed in the works of Sen [31], Atkinson, [32], Ebert [33], and Hunter et al [34].…”

Section: Fiscally Safe Welfare Policies To Be Continued In Sectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We posit that applying the rules and norms of wealth redistribution pertaining to P( , h ) At the sample Ppσ, θ`h¨1{2µq of the income density distribution, µ solves the equation ş x 0 Ppσ, θ`h¨xqdσ " 0.5 for x; µ " 82. 30 . Appendix A1 contains the analytical form for the sample expression in Figure 1.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Left- and Right-Wing Political Power Design: The Dilemma of Welfare Policy with Low-Income Relief

Mullat¹

2016

Social Sciences

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Abstract:Findings from this experiment contributed novel insights into the theoretical field of welfare policy, addressing fundamental questions about wealth redistribution rules and norms. The expenses of the redistribution pertaining to basic goods, as well as those associated with public (non-basic) but vital goods, are separately estimated by transforming the expenses into functions of the poverty line. The findings reveal that, along the poverty line that treats all citizens equally, the politicians representing opposing ideologies decide how the redistribution of basic and vital goods should be financed. Politicians should come to an agreement, subject to an approval of their decisions by voters-citizens. However, in the absence of such approval, politicians have no alternative but to continue the negotiations. Based on this premise, we concluded that political decisions with an elevated poverty line as a parameter would give rise to inverse working incentives of benefits claimants. This may result in unbalanced books, due to the expenditure on the delivery of basic and non-basic goods to their respective destinations. By keeping the books in balance, we postulate that one half of median income µ, in accord with Fuchs point, may be used in the form of poverty line ½µ for just and fair wealth redistribution in resolving the ideological controversies between left-and right-wing politicians. Through the income exception rule equal to ½µ, as a result of a relief payments simulation, the wealth redistribution system, known since 1962 from as Friedman's Negative Income Tax (NIT), diminished the Gini coefficient.

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“…For more details see PFÄHLER (1972/73). 5 See KESSELMAN/GARFINKEL (1978); the problem is also discussed in MEADE (1972). 6 The German civil right (BGB = Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch) determines the liability (or right) to alimony; for details see HINTERBERGER (1991, pp.…”

Section: Theory and Impacts Of Nitmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pros and Cons of a Negative Income Tax

Petersen¹

1997

Reforming the Welfare State

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Professor Friedman, meet Lady Rhys-Williams: NIT vs. CIT

Cited by 29 publications

References 8 publications

Tax Modelling

Tax Modelling

The Left- and Right-Wing Political Power Design: The Dilemma of Welfare Policy with Low-Income Relief

Pros and Cons of a Negative Income Tax

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