2014
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2013.12.004
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Profit criteria involving risk in price setting of virtual products

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Cited by 28 publications
(17 citation statements)
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“…Introducing the sales-effort investment as a decision variable of the retailer results in an equilibrium that is sensitive to the retailer's utility function. This result differs from that of Chernonog and Avinadav (2014), in which equilibrium was obtained exactly as in a deterministic case for any utility function. Second, we consider bi-criteria decision making in a two-echelon supply chain.…”
Section: A N U S C R I P Tcontrasting
confidence: 73%
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“…Introducing the sales-effort investment as a decision variable of the retailer results in an equilibrium that is sensitive to the retailer's utility function. This result differs from that of Chernonog and Avinadav (2014), in which equilibrium was obtained exactly as in a deterministic case for any utility function. Second, we consider bi-criteria decision making in a two-echelon supply chain.…”
Section: A N U S C R I P Tcontrasting
confidence: 73%
“…Second, we consider bi-criteria decision making in a two-echelon supply chain. In Chernonog and Avinadav (2014), in contrast, bi-criteria analysis is carried out for only one decision maker without a game approach.…”
Section: A N U S C R I P Tmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…Li et al analyze the profit distribution mechanism in cooperation mode and shows that the optimal direct channel price and optimal retailer channel price are not influenced whether retailer and manufacturer cooperate or not, but influenced by risk aversion of two parties within certain conditions, manufacturer and retailer will achieve Pareto optimal if they choose cooperation [2]. Chernonog et al seek to maximize each of three criteria: expected profit, the likelihood of achieving a profit target, and the profit for a given percentile [3]. Wang et al find that the optimal prices of dual-channel, the added value and the expected profit decreased with the increasing risk-averse value and demand variance under decentralized decisions [4].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%