Profit distribution of liner alliance based on shapley value

Abstract

Profit distribution plays an important role in the sustainable and stable development of liner alliances, this paper tries to solve the profit distribution issues in the liner alliance based on Shapley Value Method. Meanwhile, seeing that there is little consideration from the customer satisfaction, this paper establishes a new model by revising Shapley Value Method to distribute the profit of liner alliances from the perspectives of suppliers and customers and carry out verification through case analysis. The profit distribution method proposed in the paper is helpful to the reasonable profit distribution of liner alliance. It ensures the continuity and stability of liner alliance and provides a scientific decision-making basis for the profit distribution of liner alliance.

A Cost Allocation Decision Model for Air Pollution Control

“…With Y i said I in the case of a project I partners from the alliance profit maximum V ( I ) in income, namely, the income gained by the each participant in the I uses letters to represent Y , this model is a cost allocation which should not only meet the rationality of overall but also at the same time to meet the individual rationality [ 25 , 26 ], as shown below: where V ( I ) represents the benefit that I, a participant, can obtain by completing the project alone, and V ( I ) represents the maximum benefit that can be obtained in many cooperative alliances [ 27 , 28 ]. At this point, we get the Shapley value we want to find, which is called Y i ( v ): where S is a subset of all combinations of I , and | S | is the number of project-related stakeholders in a collaboration S , and W (| S |) is the weight.…”

Mitigating Bias and Error in Machine Learning to Protect Sports Data

“…This share is proportional to how important each player is in the coalition. The foundation of this value was based on four axioms, which are [ 15 , 34 – 36 ]: Symmetry: if i and j are two players of equal value in a game, i.e., when For each coalition S of N , then φ i ( v ) = φ j ( v ). Cumulative: if two games are combined that have the characteristic equations v and w , respectively, then the total payout of a player i who participates in both games is equal to the payout that he would have separately in the game with characteristic equation v plus the payout had separately in the game with distinct equation w : φ i ( v + w ) = φ i ( v )+ φ i ( w ).…”

“…The greater the player's influence, the greater the payout that he distributes. Shapley values also have universal explanation capabilities, summing the values of a set of samples [ 34 , 35 ].…”

Formation of Coordinated Alliance for China Railway Express Platforms Considering Logistics Cost Sharing

“…As for the same distribution situation, Xue and Cheng ( 36 ) put forward the AHP-raiffa cost-sharing model, which takes into account such factors as the cost of personalized services, risk cost and resources. Guo et al ( 37 ) revised first the traditional Shapley value from the perspective of suppliers and then the weight of distribution from the perspective of customers using TOPSIS, and finally concluded the profit distribution scheme of a shipping alliance. Duan et al ( 38 ) determined the optimal profit distribution scheme of a seaport–rail combined transport alliance by using the Myerson value.…”