Program Explanation and Higher-Order Properties

Abstract

Our aim in this paper is to evaluate Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit's 'program explanation' framework as an account of the autonomy of the special sciences. We argue that this framework can only explain the autonomy of a limited range of special science explanations. The reason for this limitation is that the framework overlooks a distinction between two kinds of properties, which we refer to as 'higher-level' and 'higher-order' properties. The program explanation framework can account for the autonomy of special science explanations that appeal to higher-level properties but it does not account for the autonomy of most of those explanations that appeal to higher-order properties.

Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science since 1980

“…Jackson and Pettit argue that the equality of the forces programs for the equality of effects even though it does not cause it. Program explanations are, they argue, a viable and necessary alternative to process explanations, which are explanations in terms of the causally efficacious properties (see also Bliss and Fernandez 2010). If we are to give up on program explanations then we must dismiss all the perfectly good explanations offered by the special sciences, and even those offered by physics that involve reference to an indeterminate number of things (Jackson and Pettit 1990b, p.112).…”