2013
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-39218-4_18
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Program Transformation for Non-interference Verification on Programs with Pointers

Abstract: Part 4: Software SecurityInternational audienceNovel approaches for dynamic information flow monitoring are promising since they enable permissive (accepting a large subset of executions) yet sound (rejecting all insecure executions) enforcement of non-interference. In this paper, we present a dynamic information flow monitor for a language supporting pointers. Our flow-sensitive monitor relies on prior static analysis in order to soundly enforce non-interference. We also propose a program transformation that … Show more

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Cited by 5 publications
(7 citation statements)
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“…In this section we set the stage by describing the underlying Frama-C framework and the constraints and goals that inuenced our design. To make the paper self-contained, we also discuss the handling of various language constructs of C in our previous work [2,4].…”
Section: An Overview Of Secure Flowmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…In this section we set the stage by describing the underlying Frama-C framework and the constraints and goals that inuenced our design. To make the paper self-contained, we also discuss the handling of various language constructs of C in our previous work [2,4].…”
Section: An Overview Of Secure Flowmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…We briey summarize the basics of the instrumentation done by Secure Flow. These operations follow the literature [19,2,1,4].…”
Section: Overview Of Information Flow Monitoringmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…As mentioned several times throughout the paper, our work is heavily based on the formulation of information flow monitoring by Assaf et al [2,1]. This work only handles pointers to scalars; we have formalized this theory in Isabelle/HOL, extended it to handle arrays, and are working on extending it further.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Another example is the SecureFlow plug-in. SecureFlow is a source-to-source transformation that encodes information flows of an input program into itself [1,2]. It is then possible to verify with E-ACSL that the generated code does not contain information flow leakage, e.g.…”
Section: Possible Usagesmentioning
confidence: 99%