Progress in Public Health Emergency Preparedness—United States, 2001–2016

severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), the causative agent of COVID-19, has spread globally, leading to more than 2 million confirmed cases (with the true prevalence of infection unknown but certainly much higher) and nearly 200,000 deaths. 1 In the early stages of the pandemic, cases were largely concentrated in the Wuhan province of China, and subsequently northern Italy, with the World Health Organization (WHO) labelling Europe as the epicenter of the pandemic as recently as March 13th. 2 However, as the pandemic progressed, the epicenter moved to the United States, with case numbers surpassing those in China by March 26th, and at the time of writing, standing at nearly four times the total confirmed cases of any other country. 1 It seems clear that the United States was not only ill-prepared and poorly positioned to deal with COVID-19, 3 but also uniquely susceptible to the spread of this illness. The rapid increase in cases, the escalating pressures on hospitals, and the latest modelling estimates suggest that the United States will bear the brunt of COVID-19 related harm as compared to many other high-income nations. It is prudent that we ask why this might be the case, particularly considering the status of the United States as the world's wealthiest country. While the predominant focus of public debate has been on political decision-making as the pandemic unfolded, this narrative fails to acknowledge additional longstanding exacerbating features in the United States that laid the ground for greater spread and slower containment of SARS-CoV-2. As with any such event, assessing the precise causes is a complex issue, but there are two important trends that we consider central to the United States'

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“… Federal Public Health Emergency Preparedness Funding Per Capita, Fiscal Years 2002‐2016 a a Adapted from Murthy et al 2017 21 …”

Section: Trends In Public Health Fundingmentioning

confidence: 99%

COVID‐19 and Underinvestment in the Public Health Infrastructure of the United States

2020

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“…According to a cross-sectional study, the most challenging aspect in implementing the 15 capabilities of the CDC’s guideline is training and planning, and 18% of failing is related to infrastructure field 36 37. Evidence from a qualitative study shows that planning and training fields are the most significant challenges faced by health workers in response to Hurricane Sandy 38.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Preparedness of community-based organisations in biohazard: reliability and validity of an assessment tool

et al. 2019

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The purpose of this study was to develop a tool for community-based health organisations (CBHOs) to evaluate the preparedness in biohazards concerning epidemics or bioterrorism. We searched concepts on partnerships of CBHOs with health systems in guidelines of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and literature. Then, we validated the researcher-made tool by face validity, content validity, exploratory factor analysis (EFA), confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) and criterion validity. Data were collected by sending the tool to 620 CBHOs serving under supervision of Iran’s ministry of health. Opinions of health professionals and stakeholders in CBHOs were used to assess face and content validity. Factor loads in EFA were based on three-factor structure that verified by CFA. We used SPSS V.18 and Mplus7 software for statistical analysis. About 105 health-based CBHOs participated. After conducting face validity and calculating content validity ratio and content validity index, we reached 54 items in the field of planning, training and infrastructure. We conducted construct validity using 105 CBHOs. Three items exchanged between the fields according to factor loads in EFA, and CFA verified the model fit as Comparative Fit Index, Tucker-Lewis index and root mean square error of approximation were 0.921, 0918 and 0.052, respectively. The Cronbach’s of the whole tool was 0.944. Spearman correlation coefficient confirmed criterion validity as coefficient was 0.736. Planning, training and infrastructure fields are the most important aspects of preparedness in health-based CBHOs. Applying the new assessment tool in future studies will show the weaknesses and capabilities of health-based CBHOs in biohazard and clear necessary intervention actions for health authorities.

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“…The reasoning for this stems from the inherent lack of preparedness for pandemics that was present in the US, even before the COVID-19 outbreak [32]. Many field experts have argued that if the US had worked to have the proper infrastructure in place in preparation for a pandemic as opposed to a response to one, they could have quickly ramped up test manufacturing and applied the necessary course of action in terms of easing regulations and coordinating with the private sector to mitigate the crisis [19]. The absence of this type of robust infrastructure is reflected in the federal government's lackluster testing strategy.…”

Section: Inadequate Testingmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Retrospective Comparative Analysis Regarding Strategies for Early COVID-19 Pandemic Mitigation in the US and South Korea

Bhansali¹,

Kumar²

2020

IJERT

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The purpose of this report is to retrospectively analyze and compare the early COVID-19 pandemic mitigation strategies of South Korea and the United States as the insights and knowledge gained can be applied to subsequent pandemics to minimize devastation. Additionally, this report will specifically give attention to the role of new emerging technologies in the detection, prevention, and treatment of this virus, as well as their role in the future and addresses early mitigation strategies that are implemented within two months of each country's first detected case. First, we present a basic historical background regarding the nature of pandemics, as well as previous early mitigation techniques and their respective outcomes. This contains a background regarding the characteristics of the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) and the COVID-19 disease; additionally, we analyze the global spread of the virus prior to the imposition of universal travel bans. The second section provides comparative analysis regarding the different preparatory measures invoked by South Korea and the United States, the country in which COVID-19 cases are most prevalent. We examine a plethora of statistics, such as the rate of spread and percent of people tested, in order to reach a holistic conclusion about the effectiveness of each country's mitigation strategy. In the third section we bring to light technological advancements that have been developed or are under development that have immense potential for application in virus detection, prevention, and mitigation.

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Progress in Public Health Emergency Preparedness—United States, 2001–2016

Abstract: Considerable progress in public health preparedness capability was observed from before 9/11 to 2016. Support, sustainment, and advancement of public health preparedness capability is critical to ensure a strong public health infrastructure.

Cited by 38 publications

References 8 publications

COVID‐19 and Underinvestment in the Public Health Infrastructure of the United States

COVID‐19 and Underinvestment in the Public Health Infrastructure of the United States

Preparedness of community-based organisations in biohazard: reliability and validity of an assessment tool

A Retrospective Comparative Analysis Regarding Strategies for Early COVID-19 Pandemic Mitigation in the US and South Korea

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