Proliferation risks of magnetic fusion energy: clandestine production, covert production and breakout

Glaser, Alexander; Goldston, Robert James

doi:10.1088/0029-5515/52/4/043004

Cited by 18 publications

(18 citation statements)

References 13 publications

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“…Goldston and Glaser analyze the idea that fusion power plants could be abused to breed special fissionable material in Refs. [58,59] and their work is summarized and further discussed in this section. Three scenarios are analyzed, which are considered comprehensive:…”

Section: Use Of Neutrons To Breed Special Fissionable Materialsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Clandestine production of special fissionable material (in a hidden facility) by a state or nonstate actor (e.g., a terrorist organization) outside the United States is not a credible threat because the power requirements and holistic footprint are readily visible. References [58] and [59] "conclude that modifications to existing safeguard protocols are not needed to detect clandestine fusion facilities." Thus, clandestine production in an unknown facility would soon become the known production scenario of the next subsection.…”

Section: Clandestine Production: Action At Unknown Facilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…A key driver for this lower level of concern is that vertical proliferation is only a practical concern for those countries that have already mastered nuclear weapons technology and, in such cases, access to booster materials is not a challenge. The US Department of Energy published "the amount of tritium in a [warhead] reservoir is typically less than 20 g" [69], and "if we consider the neutron economy of a fission reactor used to produce Pu [plutonium] and T [tritium],... any nation that is producing Pu for weapons use can, with relatively minor perturbation, produce adequate T to "boost" these weapons, even taking into account the ≈5% loss of T per year through radioactive decay" [58,59]. For example, the US has partnered with Tennessee Valley Authority's (TVA's) Watts Bar Nuclear Plant and Sequoyah Nuclear Plant to insert tritium-producing burnable absorber rods (TPBARs) that are then processed to extract the tritium [70].…”

Section: Use Of Tritium In Nuclear Weaponsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Nonproliferation and fusion power plants

Hua

Desai

Roma

et al. 2022

Preprint

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The world now appears to be on the brink of realizing commercial fusion. As fusion energy progresses towards near-term commercial deployment, the question arises as to the role of the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) with respect to fusion, including whether the nuclear nonproliferation regime includes – or should be extended to include – future fusion plants. The global nuclear nonproliferation regime, solidified in and based on the NPT, is designed to ensure that certain types of radioactive material and technology are used only for peaceful purposes and not nuclear weapons purposes. In that regard, the NPT regime controls and monitors nuclear materials and technology that could be used towards making nuclear weapons. That is, the NPT expressly restricts the transfer of source material (i.e., unenriched uranium and thorium); special fissionable material (i.e., enriched uranium (U-235), uranium-233, and plutonium-239); and equipment that is “especially designed or prepared for processing, use, or production of specialfissionable material.” As spelled out more explicitly in the implementing documents for the NPT– the International Atomic Energy Act (IAEA) safeguards agreements and associated instruments intended to be used with the safeguards agreement – such equipment is limited to nuclear fission-related technology, including fission reactors and the fission nuclear fuel cycle technologies (e.g., enrichment and conversion facilities). Therefore, the plain language of the NPT is limited in scope to source or special fissionable material, and some fission-related facilities. The NPT regulates source material because it can be enriched into special fissionable material; it regulates special fissionable material because it is, or can be enriched to be, weapons-usable material; and it regulates certain specific underlying equipment because such equipment “is especially designed or prepared” to make, use, or further refine special fissionable material. The NPT implementing documents are likewise limited to this same type of material and equipment. In relation to fission, fusion resides at the opposite end of the period table: where fission uses very heavy elements – like uranium and plutonium – to sustain a chain reaction to split atoms andrelease energy, fusion uses the lightest atoms – like hydrogen and helium – to combine (or fuse) into heavier ones and release energy. Fusion cannot sustain a fission-like chain reaction. And because fusion does not use source or special fissionable material, or associated controlled technologies(e.g., a fission reactor or uranium enrichment facility) commercial fusion applications prima facie fall outside the current NPT nonproliferation regime and implementing documents. The question then becomes whether fusion plants should be included within the NPT and associated safeguards framework, or whether the existing global export control framework appears sufficient to control the technology. To answer this requires an analysis of fusion technology and its proliferation risk profile to determine whether it is similar enough in terms of risk considerations to warrant similar treatment under – and therefore amendment of – the NPT. Based on a technical analysis explained herein, and as applied to the existing legal framework of the NPT, this paper concludes that commercial fusion facilities should continue to fall outsidethe NPT. To include fusion would require significant revision and change to the intent of the NPT, and extensive global consensus, which is not an easy task. Nor does it appear to be warranted considering that the same nonproliferation risk associated with traditional nuclear fission just does not exist for fusion. That is, as a general matter, unlike fission technology, fusion technology cannot be directly used in its existing form to support the nuclear fuel cycle for nuclear weapons, as is the subject of the NPT restrictions. Rather, this paper concludes that fusion facilities as they are “especially designed or prepared” have very limited significance to the development of nuclear weapons material for weapons purposes or nuclear weapons themselves. Rather, any potential, malicious misuse of the fusion technology from a nonproliferation perspective would require significant material changes to the underlying technology itself. But that is not to say fusion technology is not controlled to ensure it does not fall into the hands of a bad actor. On the contrary, under international trade laws, the existing export control framework still applies to fusion. This framework restricts the export of a range of technologies for certain end destinations and uses much more broadly than the NPT nonproliferation framework, and extends to other nuclear technologies such as particle accelerators and irradiators, or other facilities tangentially, but not directly related to nonproliferation. Applying – and modifying these approaches as necessary – to develop a usage-based controls regime for fusion can more effectively support the safe deployment of this essential technology, rather than applying the ill-fit, fission-specific nonproliferation regime.

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Section: Use Of Neutrons To Breed Special Fissionable Materialsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Clandestine Production: Action At Unknown Facilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Use Of Tritium In Nuclear Weaponsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Nonproliferation and fusion power plants

Hua

Desai

Roma

et al. 2022

Preprint

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“…Prior works have investigated this misuse, notably Refs. [60,61], and their work is summarized and further discussed in this section. Three scenarios are analyzed, which are considered comprehensive:…”

Section: Use Of Neutrons To Breed Special Fissionable Materialsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Based on optimistic extrapolations of plasma physics, device engineering, and fusion technology according to Ref. [61], a theoretical device could draw 40 MW of continuous grid power to produce 1.8 MW of continuous fusion power. Assuming an 85% duty factor and that 80% of neutrons are captured in a breeding blanket (containing uranium or thorium), this device could hypothetically produce 3.5 kg of plutonium or U-233 per year [61].…”

Section: Clandestine Production: Action At Unknown Facilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Nonproliferation and fusion power plants

Hua¹,

Desai²,

Roma³

et al. 2022

Preprint

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Fusion Energy by Magnetic Confinement

Wagner

2003

Digital Encyclopedia of Applied Physics

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Fusion is the energy source of the universe. The local conditions in the core of the sun allow the transfer of mass into energy, which is finally released in the form of radiation. Technical fusion melts deuterons and tritons to helium, releasing large amounts of energy per fusion process. Because of the conditions for fusion, which will be deduced, the fusion fuel is in the plasma state. Here, we report on the confinement of fusion plasmas by magnetic fields. Different confinement concepts – tokamaks and stellarators – are introduced and described. The first fusion reactor, ITER , and the most modern stellarator, W endelstein 7‐X , are under construction. Their basic features and objectives are presented. In addition, the fusion technology program is discussed along with safety and proliferation issues of fusion electricity production. Finally, the question of whether the application of fusion, which cannot penetrate the electricity market before 2050, will come too late or be too expensive is answered.

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Proliferation risks of magnetic fusion energy: clandestine production, covert production and breakout

Cited by 18 publications

References 13 publications

Nonproliferation and fusion power plants

Nonproliferation and fusion power plants

Nonproliferation and fusion power plants

Fusion Energy by Magnetic Confinement

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