2009
DOI: 10.1016/j.avb.2009.06.007
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Promoting aggression and violence at Abu Ghraib: The U.S. military's transformation of ordinary people into torturers

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
2
1
1

Citation Types

0
19
1

Year Published

2014
2014
2022
2022

Publication Types

Select...
6
3

Relationship

0
9

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 38 publications
(20 citation statements)
references
References 6 publications
0
19
1
Order By: Relevance
“…The official government response to the atrocity was to attribute blame to individual soldiers, directing the focus particularly to the seven publicly implicated soldiers and away from broader systemic factors. In what became known as the 'bad apple' versus 'bad barrel' debate, independent commentators argued instead that the situation itself was to blame for the behaviour of these ordinary individual soldiers (Lankford 2009;Zimbardo 2007). …”
Section: Conflict Zonesmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…The official government response to the atrocity was to attribute blame to individual soldiers, directing the focus particularly to the seven publicly implicated soldiers and away from broader systemic factors. In what became known as the 'bad apple' versus 'bad barrel' debate, independent commentators argued instead that the situation itself was to blame for the behaviour of these ordinary individual soldiers (Lankford 2009;Zimbardo 2007). …”
Section: Conflict Zonesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…They were advised that different rules applied to Abu Ghraib prisoners, consistent with the brutality towards other prisoners actioned at Guantanamo Bay and in Afghanistan (Human Rights Watch 2005;Lankford 2009). Bystander inaction at Abu Ghraib reinforced these norms, with numerous soldiers reportedly witnessing abuse but taking no action to address or formally report it.…”
Section: Conflict Zonesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Recent social psychology research suggests that participants refuse to obey direct orders (Burger et al, 2011) probably because its use by authority dismantles the group relationship between participants and authority (Reicher & Haslam, 2011). At the same time, analyses of recent crimes of obedience emphasized on the important role of coercive pressure (e.g., Lankford, 2009). We found a higher level of obedience in the ''Compliance with pressure'' condition than in the ''Compliance without pressure,'' which seems to support the view that coercive pressure is a key component of the obedience process.…”
Section: Obedience Ratesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Milgram's studies have been used in explanations of abuses and atrocities such as the Holocaust (see Miller, 2004), the My Lai massacre (Milgram, 1974), and the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuses (Lankford, 2009), as well as in more general explanations of phenomena such as terrorism (Fiske, Harris & Cuddy, 2004), yet it is rare to see them used to draw out lessons concerning how people might resist authority. To take just one example of how such issues may be addressed, in the UK 'obedience' is part of the curriculum for diplomas in 'Public Services (Uniformed)' (Edexcel, 2012).…”
Section: Policy Implicationsmentioning
confidence: 99%