Promoting democracy through economic conditionality in the ENP: a normative critique

Theuns, Tom

doi:10.1080/07036337.2016.1263625

Cited by 11 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 27 publications

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“…As such, it operates on an ‘internal’ rather than an ‘external’ mode of critique. This is related to methods of ‘immanent critique’ whereby a minimal normative standard of a political practice is that it does not violate its own normative premises (Nicolaïdis 2013 ; Theuns 2017 ). There are many ways immanent critique has been interpreted, but the analysis here consists of the critical normative evaluation of a practice grounded not on an external set of normative values but on justificatory standards drawn internally from legal and political praxis.…”

Section: The Need For Expressive Consistency In Defending Eu Fundamental Values and The Performative Contradiction Of The Current Articlementioning

confidence: 99%

The Need for an EU Expulsion Mechanism: Democratic Backsliding and the Failure of Article 7

Theuns

2022

Res Publica

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What should the EU do about the fact that some Member States are backsliding on their commitments to democracy, supposedly a fundamental value of the EU? The Treaty provisions under Article 7 TEU are widely criticized for being ineffective in preventing such developments. Are they legitimate? I argue that the ultimate sanction of Article 7 TEU falls into a performative contradiction, which undermines its ability to coherently defend fundamental values. Instead, expulsion from the EU is the appropriate, coherent and legitimate final political sanction for democratic and rule of law backsliding by a Member State. The argument has the following steps: In Part 1, I argue that the current Article 7 framework for responding to democratic and rule of law backsliding in the EU is normatively problematic, in that the mechanism currently in the Treaty undermines the values it purports to defend; in other words, it falls into a performative contradiction. It is undemocratic to deprive Member States of their right to vote in the Council while holding them subject to Council decisions. However, Part 2 studies relevant philosophical arguments from an adjacent literature on criminal disenfranchisement, concluding that allowing backsliding Member States to keep their voting rights in the Council also taints the democratic character of Council decision-making. In Part 3, I consider the resulting paradox in light of the literature on militant democracy. Could militant democracy justify Article 7? I argue not; even if we accept the hypothetical justifiability of militant measures, they are not legitimate here since a democratically acceptable alternative exists that would safeguard the democratic character and legitimacy of Council decision-making: expulsion from the Union. I also address a central objection to an expulsion mechanism—that it would require treaty change and is therefore practically impossible.

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Section: The Need For Expressive Consistency In Defending Eu Fundamental Values and The Performative Contradiction Of The Current Articlementioning

confidence: 99%

The Need for an EU Expulsion Mechanism: Democratic Backsliding and the Failure of Article 7

Theuns

2022

Res Publica

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“…Antii Kauppinen gives a clear exposition of this approach-which he labels "simple internal critique"-free of tradition-specific jargon (2002: 483-484). For recent examples of the application of this argumentative strategy, see, for example, Nicolaïdis (2013) or Theuns (2017).…”

Section: Acknowledgmentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pluralist Democracy and Non-Ideal Democratic Legitimacy

Theuns

2021

Democratic Theory

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The boundary problem holds that, whatever the theory of democratic legitimacy, the initial act of constituting the demos can never be considered met by it. Many contemporary attempts to solve the boundary problem can be understood as falling into two categories: functional demos views and global demos views. This article argues against both views. Functional demos views exacerbate the legitimacy puzzle posed by the boundary problem, while a global democracy cannot be held democratically accountable by its citizens. In the place of global demos and functional demos views, we ought to examine the democratic legitimacy of polities in light of the standards of pluralist democracy. Pluralist democracy is a non-ideal conception of democracy that recognizes democratic procedures to be historically grounded, non-ideal, and problem-oriented.

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“…Ordinarily, there is little trouble in applying such a principle of democratic equality to argue that states subject to the laws of the EU ought to have voting rights in EU institutional decisionmaking bodies such as the Council (and, proportionally to their population, in the European Parliament). Indeed, I have used this logic to argue that the EU foreign policy instruments such as the European Neighbourhood Policy are democratically illegitimate when they require states that are not EU members to adopt large swathes of the acqui communautaire in order to access privileges (Theuns, 2017). However, the particularities of democratic and rule of law backsliding throw up an additional hurdle: it is only when we assume that a given government is the democratically legitimate representative of its citizens that their authority to (co)decide in institutions like the Council is justified.…”

Section: Tom Theunsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…I have made a structurally similar critique of EU democracy promotion, arguing that certain anti-democratic measures in EU-negotiated free trade agreements undermine the democratic character of EU foreign policy even if they would have the eventual effect of democratizing the partner state(Theuns, 2019; see alsoTheuns, 2017).…”

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Containing Populism at the Cost of Democracy? Political vs. Economic Responses to Democratic Backsliding in the EU

Theuns¹

2020

GJN

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This paper critically engages the legal and political framework for responding to democracy and rule of law backsliding in the EU. I develop a new and original critique of Article 7 TEU based on it being democratically illegitimate and normatively incoherent qua itself in conflict with EU fundamental values. Other more incremental and scaleable responses are desirable, and the paper moves on to assess the legitimacy of economic sanctions such as tying access to EU funds to performance on democratic and rule of law indicators or imposing fines on backsliding states. I hold such sanctions to be a priori legitimate, and argue that in some cases economic sanctions are even normatively required, given that EU material support of backsliding member states can amount to material complicity in their backsliding. However, an economic conditionality mechanism would need to be designed to minimize unjust and counterproductive effects. One way to pursue this could be to complement sanctions against the backsliding government with investment for prodemocratic actors in that state.

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Promoting democracy through economic conditionality in the ENP: a normative critique

Cited by 11 publications

References 27 publications

The Need for an EU Expulsion Mechanism: Democratic Backsliding and the Failure of Article 7

The Need for an EU Expulsion Mechanism: Democratic Backsliding and the Failure of Article 7

Pluralist Democracy and Non-Ideal Democratic Legitimacy

Containing Populism at the Cost of Democracy? Political vs. Economic Responses to Democratic Backsliding in the EU

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