Promoting Effective Consultation? Assessing the Impact of the ICE Regulations

Abstract

Drawing on evidence from longitudinal case studies in 25 organizations, this article examines whether information and consultation (I&C) bodies established in the context of the UK's Information and Consultation of EmployeesRegulations 2004 have been the vehicle for effective consultation, based on objective criteria. Assessed against the regulations' default provisions that require I&C concerning strategic business issues and major organizational change, a substantial minority of participating organizations were categorized as 'active consulters', while a majority were 'communicators'. The differing trajectories of I&C primarily reflected internal organizational dynamics, particularly management's approach to consultation. Beyond providing the catalyst for managerial moves to introduce I&C, the influence of the statutory framework proved largely peripheral.

Employer occupation of regulatory space of the Employee Information and Consultation (I&C) Directive in liberal market economies

“…(DETE, 2001a) Relating to the second macro-level pattern, transposition of the regulations by government, the public consultation exercise allowed interested parties to offer their interpretation of how the I&C Directive should be transposed. Various employer bodies sought to protect small businesses by insisting that the regulations be restricted to organisations employing more than 50 staff (Hall et al, 2011). In addition, employees have to actively 'trigger' their rights; something that can be extremely risky for unorganised and non-union workers who might fear employer reprisals (Dundon and Gollan, 2007).…”

“…Both the UK and Irish governments transposed the Directive in a way that reflected variation in national custom (Hall et al, 2011). In Ireland, the overriding concern was to avoid legislation that favoured mandatory collective voice systems which might jeopardize inward investment from (non-union) US multinationals (Lavelle et al, 2010).…”

“…The implication is that the state effectively favoured individualised arrangements over harder statutory provisions for collective representative participation that might have encouraged stronger power-sharing collaborations . Extant empirical evidence five years after the transposition of I&C regulations indicates that management dominate I&C provisions and control the agenda (Hall et al, 2011).…”

“…This reassessment of regulatory purpose can now be partly interpreted as a means of employer protection against collectively organized employees, rather than the other way round (Donaghey et al, 2011). EU-led regulations have gravitated from hard or protective laws (such as equal pay and health & safety) towards 'softer' light touch measures allowing member states greater latitude to transpose arrangements fitting national cultures (Gold, 2009;Hall et al, 2011). What distinguishes emerging EU social policy is its 'low capacity to impose binding obligations on market participants, and the high degree to which it depends on various kinds of voluntarism ... in the name of self-regulation' (Streeck, 1995: 45-49).…”

“…There was a perception that the Directive was introduced with specifically the UK and Ireland in mind, given they were the only two EU member states at the time lacking generalized employee voice legislation (Hall et al, 2011).…”