Promoting the freedom of thought of mental health service users: Nussbaum’s capabilities approach meets values-based practice

Abstract

This article clarifies how the freedom of thought as a human right can be understood and promoted as a right of mental health service users, especially people with psychotic disorder, by using Martha Nussbaum's capabilities approach and Fulford's and Fulford 's values-based practice. According to Nussbaum, freedom of thought seems to primarily protect the capability to think, believe and feel. This capability can be promoted in the context of mental health services by values-based practice. The article points out that both Nussbaum's approach and values-based practice recognise that people's values differ. The idea of involving different actors and service users in mental healthcare is also common in both Nussbaum's approach and values-based practice. However, there are also differences in that values-based practice relies on a 'good process' in decision-making, whereas the capabilities approach is oriented towards a 'right outcome'. However, since process and outcome are linked with each other, these two approaches do not necessarily conflict despite this difference. The article suggests that absolute rights are possible within the two approaches. It also recognises that the capabilities approach, values-based practice and human rights approach lean on liberal values and thus can be combined at least in liberal societies.

Forum Internum Revisited: Considering the Absolute Core of Freedom of Belief and Opinion in Terms of Negative Liberty, Authenticity, and Capability

“…However, Nussbaum also highlights the role of certain liberties, namely, freedom of speech, freedom of association, and freedom of conscience, and asserts that these have a Bnon-negotiable place.^Thus, at the same time that the list of capabilities is open for amendment, some of it is non-negotiable. Since Nussbaum (2006, 342) also seems to claim that there should be something in persons which is inviolable, the idea that some absolute rights exist could probably be defended in the context of the capabilities approach (see also Stenlund 2017).…”