Promotion of cooperation due to diversity of players in the spatial public goods game with increasing neighborhood size

Individual choice and reputation distribution of cooperative behaviors among heterogeneous groups

“…Researchers in related fields including spatial game theory [4][5][6] have proposed many solutions or counter-temptation mechanisms [3,[7][8][9] to overcome temptation and promote cooperation. Spatial prisoners' dilemma games [5,6,9,10] and * Tel.…”

“…Reputation records agents' history of cooperation or defection, so that each individuals or agents are able to identify, cooperate with, or imitate the neighbor with highest reputation [2,3,5]. It indicates in experiments of reputation-based spatial game theory that reputation does countervail temptation and enhances cooperation effectively [2][3][4]6,8,9]. However, three issues remain unsolved: First, most of existing studies deem cooperation as the explained variable, while keeping reputation as one of the explaining variables [2,3,5,8], and therefore The whole society on a square lattice consists of three classes: common in blue has the standard payoff matrix; elite in red gets higher payoff when cooperating; scoundrel in green obtains higher payoff when defecting.…”

“…ignoring its evolution on traits of distribution. As the outcome of individual choice, it should be deemed as an independent or explained variable as well; second, reputation merely indicates the non-negative summation of individual choice [3,5,24,58], which is not enough in that defection should be a negative term otherwise; third, spatial games with reputation are usually played within a homogenous groups [6,59], while in the real world diversity [6,17,24,27] and heterogeneity [31,59] are pervasive.…”

“…Under the paradigm of spatial lattice-based games [5,6,14,15,17], this work provides one possible solution to these problems and expands related research on reputation: the first problem is fixed by deeming reputation as the outcome variable of individual choices, distribution of reputation including mean and standard deviation would be investigated as well; expanding the definition of reputation solves the second one, so that the fluctuation reputation indicating dynamic choices would be seen; heterogeneous sub-groups are introduced to settle the problem of homogeneity.…”

Evolution of cooperation in the traveler’s dilemma game on two coupled lattices

“…Thus, a dilemma arises and understanding the widespread phenomenon of cooperation becomes an interdisciplinary challenge from natural, biological, social and mathematical sciences [2][3][4][5]. Among them, evolutionary game theory [6] is often utilized as a powerful tool to illustrate the emergency of cooperation between unrelated and selfish individuals, in which the cooperation phenomenon, to a greater extent, can be accounted for through various game models including the prisoner's dilemma game (PDG) [7][8][9][10][11][12][13], snowdrift game (SDG) [14][15][16][17][18] and public goods game (PGG) [19][20][21][22][23][24][25] and so on. Beginning with these models, many quantitative and qualitative results assist in explaining the evolution of cooperation inside many real-worlds systems [3][4][5].…”