Promotion of cooperation in social dilemma games via generalised indirect reciprocity

Chiong, Raymond; Kirley, Michael

doi:10.1080/09540091.2015.1080226

Cited by 8 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 39 publications

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“…This feature is shared by models of generalized reciprocity (Hamilton and Taborsky, 2005;Pfeiffer et al, 2005;Chiong and Kirley, 2015), where individuals make decisions based on the previous encounter with other group members. A driving force of evolution of generalized reciprocity is assortment of cooperative strategies (Rankin and Taborsky, 2009) based on contingent movement of individuals between groups (Hamilton and Taborsky, 2005), a small group size (Pfeiffer et al, 2005) (but see Barta et al (2011), where random drift helps generalized reciprocity to overcome initial disadvantage in a large group), or network structure (van Doorn and Taborsky, 2012).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary Dynamics of Coordinated Cooperation

Ohtsuki

2018

Front. Ecol. Evol.

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In social evolution theory, unconditional cooperation has been seen as an evolutionarily unsuccessful strategy unless there is a mechanism that promotes positive assortment between like individuals. One such example is kin selection, where individuals sharing common ancestry and therefore having the same strategy are more likely to interact with each other. Conditional cooperation, on the other hand, can be successful if interactions with the same partners last long. In many previous models, it has been assumed that individuals act conditionally on the past behavior of others. Here I propose a new model of conditional cooperation, namely the model of coordinated cooperation. Coordinated cooperation means that there is a negotiation before an actual game is played, and that each individual can flexibly change their decision, either to cooperation or to defection, according to the number of those who show the intention of cooperation/defection. A notable feature of my model is that individuals play an actual game only once but can still use conditional strategies. Since such a negotiation is cognitively demanding, the target of my model here is exclusively human behavior. I have analyzed cultural evolutionary dynamics of conditional strategies in this framework. Results for an infinitely large population show that conditional cooperation not only works as a catalyst for the evolution of cooperation, but sustains a polymorphic attractor with unconditional cooperators, unconditional defectors, and conditional cooperators being present. A finite population analysis is also performed. Overall, my results provide one explanation of why people tend to take into account others' decisions even when doing so gives them no payoff consequences at all.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary Dynamics of Coordinated Cooperation

Ohtsuki

2018

Front. Ecol. Evol.

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“…A key innovation of this trial study, relative to past pay-it-forward research, is developing and evaluating the community-engaged approach as an additional intervention arm. While upstream reciprocity is hypothesized to promote the pay-it-forward mechanism, simulation models of the process show that the "warm glow" does not guarantee sustainability [ 44 ]. In contrast, evidence shows that when combined with network reciprocity, where acts of altruism are reinforced by a community of collaborators, the probability of cooperation increases [ 45 ].…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pay-it-forward gonorrhea and chlamydia testing among men who have sex with men and male STD patients in China: the PIONEER pragmatic, cluster randomized controlled trial protocol

Marley

Tan

et al. 2023

BMC Public Health

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Background Gonorrhea and chlamydia are the most common sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) among men who have sex with men (MSM) in China. Previous studies have shown pay-it-forward (PIF) interventions to be associated with a substantial increase in gonorrhea and chlamydia test uptake compared to standard-of-care. We propose a 'pay-it-forward' gonorrhea and chlamydia testing randomized controlled trial (PIONEER). The trial would evaluate the effectiveness of two pay-it-forward strategies in promoting testing uptake compared to the standard of care (in which men pay for their tests out-of-pocket) among MSM and male STD patients in China. Methods PIONEER will be a three-armed, pragmatic cluster randomized controlled trial (RCT), conducted across 12 clinics (six MSM-led and six public STD clinics) to compare the effectiveness of three implementation strategies. Each facility will be randomized to a standard pay-it-forward intervention of gonorrhea/ chlamydia testing with minimal encouragement for testing, a community-engaged pay-it-forward arm, or a control arm where men pay for their tests out-of-pockets. The primary outcome will be dual gonorrhea/chlamydia test uptake. Secondary outcomes will include syphilis testing, amount donated in pay-it-forward, number of positive gonorrhea and chlamydia tests, and measures of antimicrobial resistance. A sequential transformative mixed methods design will be used to evaluate the implementation process in type 2 effectiveness-implementation hybrid design. Data sources will include survey on acceptability, and feelings and attitudes towards the interventions among participants; testing and treatment uptake data from clinic records, WeChat records, and qualitative data to gain insights into men's perceptions and attitudes towards the pay-it-forward, mechanisms driving uptake, and donating behaviors. Implementers and organizers will be interviewed about fidelity and adherence to protocol, sustainability of pay-it-forward intervention, and barriers and facilitators of implementing the intervention. Discussion PIONEER will substantially increase gonorrhea/chlamydia testing among MSM in China, providing an innovative and new financial mechanism to sustain STD screening among sexual minorities in low- and middle-income countries. This study will answer compelling scientific questions about how best to implement pay-it-forward and the individual and organizational characteristics that moderate it. Trial registration: The study with identification number NCT05723263 has been registered on clinicaltrials.gov/.

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“…Theoretical models predict that the direct reciprocity decision rule (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981; Nowak, 2006; Trivers, 1971) and the generalized reciprocity decision rule (Barta et al., 2011; Boyd & Richerson, 1989; Chiang & Takahashi, 2011; Chiong & Kirley, 2015; Iwagami & Masuda, 2010; Nowak & Roch, 2007; Pfeiffer et al., 2005; Rankin & Taborsky, 2009; Stojkoski et al., 2018; van Doorn & Taborsky, 2012) can generate evolutionarily stable levels of cooperation under a wide range of conditions (reviewed in Taborsky et al., 2016, 2021). Evolutionarily stable cooperation is easier to establish if the exchange of help is concurrent; however, there is often a time delay between help given and help received, which hampers reciprocal help but does not prevent it (van Doorn et al., 2014).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Reciprocal altruism in Norway rats

Engelhardt,

Taborsky

2023

Ethology

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Reciprocal altruism has been proposed to generate evolutionarily stable levels of cooperation, but empirical evidence in non‐human animals is contentious. A series of experimental studies on Norway rats revealed that these animals reciprocate received help by using decision rules characterising direct and generalized reciprocity. The direct reciprocity decision rule states that individuals should help someone who previously helped them, whereas the generalized reciprocity decision rule implies that individuals should help anyone after having received help from someone. Here, we present results from meta‐analyses assessing if Norway rats generally help partners according to the direct and generalized reciprocity decision rules by giving more help sooner and matching help received either to previously cooperative partners or to anyone after having received help from a conspecific. We also compared the rats' performance when applying the direct or generalized reciprocity decision rules. Results from these meta‐analyses clearly show that female and male focal rats help partners according to the direct reciprocity decision rule. Rats did not adjust the amount of help they gave by matching the help they received according to both the direct and generalized reciprocity decision rules; however, they may adjust the duration to the first help they gave by matching the help they received according to the direct reciprocity decision rule. Female, but not male, focal rats help partners according to the generalized reciprocity decision rule. There was no apparent difference in the help given by female rats to partners between the direct and generalized reciprocity decision rules. These results (i) demonstrate, across a wide range of studies, the reciprocal cooperation of Norway rats by use of decision rules denoting direct and generalized reciprocity, and (ii) suggest that rats may frequently apply the cognitively less demanding decision rule of generalized reciprocity, unless they need to distinguish between individuals differing in helpfulness.

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Promotion of cooperation in social dilemma games via generalised indirect reciprocity

Cited by 8 publications

References 39 publications

Evolutionary Dynamics of Coordinated Cooperation

Evolutionary Dynamics of Coordinated Cooperation

Pay-it-forward gonorrhea and chlamydia testing among men who have sex with men and male STD patients in China: the PIONEER pragmatic, cluster randomized controlled trial protocol

Reciprocal altruism in Norway rats

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