Promotion of Intellectual Activity Results of Scientific Organizations. Regulatory Framework and Statistics

The article presents the details of ideas and proposals announced by the author in 2021 within the framework of the round table of the “Science Management: Theory and Practice” journal (on the topic “Science in an Innovative Economy”). The proposed measures are considered as increasingly relevant in the face of the long-term confrontation with the ‘collective West’, which is striving for scientific and economic isolation of contemporary Russia, as well as in relation to the national goals and objectives set by the country’s leadership for the period up to 2036. The second part of the article deals with the structural as well as administrative and legal features of the Russian science and technology complex. It numbers over four thousand organizations that carry out research and development activities in substantially separate sectors of “civil” and “defense” science. As a result, a proposal is submitted to the readers to integrate research and development that produce new fundamental scientific knowledge, end-to-end high-tech technologies and relevant intellectual activity results in the interests of socio-economic development, the national defense and security of the state in a specialized state corporation by giving it the authority to regulate scientific research and technological activities, including those in relation to the rest of the bulk of Russian research organizations of different branches. It is proposed to implement a thoroughgoing reform in the field of Russian science by adoption of appropriate new federal laws.

On the Separation of Scientific Activity and the State-owned Corporate Form of Science Management in Contemporary Russia. Part 2

Krivoruchko

2024

Promotion of Intellectual Activity Results of Scientific Organizations. An Assessment of Potential Demand

Ganieva,

Shepelev

2024

The article examines the markets of intellectual activity results (IAR) in Russia. We have conducted an analysis of the costs of innovation activities in terms of the purchase of IAR and R&D in the economy as a whole and in the industrial production sector as the largest one in the context of acquiring IAR. It is shown that the scale of costs for IAR is about 1% of the total expenditures on innovation and has tended to increase in recent years. The costs of purchasing IAR by industry are analyzed; it is shown that the largest amount of expenditures falls on the sphere of industrial production. In this area, the share of IAR acquisition costs is higher than in the economy as a whole and averages 1.5%. We consider the share of IAR purchases from external suppliers. In general, 54.6% of IAR are purchased from third-party organizations, and 59.3% are acquired in industrial production. The costs of purchasing IAR at the expense of own and external sources of financing are analyzed; it is noted that the largest amount of own funds (64.0% against 55.1% in the economy as a whole) is spent in the field of industrial production. Having regard to the scale of the markets, we analyze the best options for IAR protection in cases of various types of organizations. Examples of IAR protection options for large organizations with a substantial volume of output and for small innovative enterprises with a relatively low output rate are considered. The conclusion is made about the expediency of using protection for small companies through the introduction of a trade secret regime. We also carry out an analysis of the costs of research and development purchased from third-party organizations by industry. It is shown that the R&D markets significantly exceed the IAR markets. This also makes the sale of IAR through R&D more attractive than through the sale of licenses. In general, the thesis put forward in the previous article is confirmed. It says that a low activity of working with IAR is determined by economic factors.

Promotion of Intellectual Activity Results of Scientific Organizations. Value Estimation

Ganieva,

Shepelev

2024

We consider approaches to assessing the value of intellectual activity results (IAR) from the points of view of the seller and the buyer. The analysis was carried out on the basis of a comparison of the total costs of implementing IAR in which the purchase of a license may be only a part of the costs. The analysis takes into account the risks associated with the implementation of IAR. They can potentially lead to reducing the economic performance in the realization of IAR. The authors examine choices of buyers and sellers in relation to the purchase and sale of IAR, taking into account the scale of the markets available to them. Some considerations explaining the low activity on the IAR market in Russia by the scale of business and the size of manufacturing companies are presented. We define the reasons for the low interest of scientific organizations in promoting IAR for sale. They are a consequence of the small volume of markets and can also be explained by the fact that using budgetary funds, research institutions can cover the costs of creating IAR more substantially than they can by selling IAR on the market. We have formulated proposals that make it possible to increase the efficiency of the work of scientific organizations with IAR. In particular, a reasonable economic policy focuses on sales of IAR through R&D (including with the assistance of extra-budgetary funds). With regard to the reserves being created, it is advisable to use protection options that do not disclose the essence of the IAR and uphold the protection period with significant time spent on searching. This, for instance, may be an option to set up a trade secret regime with subsequent patenting within the framework of R&D for the benefit of a particular buyer. This approach reduces the risks not only for the seller, but also for the buyer. For government agencies, it can be recommended to increase the importance of license sales while assessing efficiency in comparison with simple registration of IAR. It is advisable to finance applied R&D involving the creation of IAR if there is a guarantee for the implementation of the corresponding IAR by developers or industrial partners.