Property Rights and the Role of the State: Evidence from the Horn of Africa

Joireman, Sandra F.

doi:10.1080/713601100

Cited by 9 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 14 publications

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“…In the pastoral areas, it also established state ranches, set up settlement programmes for pastoralists, introduced forced livestock sales, enforced a ban on bushfires, and provided special support for cultivation. Although some of these policies have been repealed since the early 1990s, there is evidence of disruption of the social system and values of mobile pastoralism, to which current resource conflicts are strongly hypothesised as being related (Coppock, 1994: 39;Joireman, 2001;Swallow and Kamara, 1999: 244).…”

Section: Level Of Conflictmentioning

confidence: 99%

Policies, Interventions and Institutional Change in Pastoral Resource Management in Borana, Southern Ethiopia

Kamara

Swallow

Kirk

2004

Development Policy Review

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The Borana rangelands of Southern Ethiopia are characterised by extensive livestock production under a communal land-use system that has evolved in response to variable rainfall and uncertain production conditions. However, the last two decades have witnessed an increasing privatisation of rangelands for crop production and private grazing. The results of a quantitative assessment are used to develop a framework for assessing the drivers of change and their long-term implications. It is concluded that certain national policies have resulted in conflicts of authority between traditional and formal systems, creating an avenue for spontaneous enclosures, associated conflicts and decreasing human welfare.

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Section: Level Of Conflictmentioning

confidence: 99%

Policies, Interventions and Institutional Change in Pastoral Resource Management in Borana, Southern Ethiopia

Kamara

Swallow

Kirk

2004

Development Policy Review

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“…While we do not entirely discount the validity of such arguments, there are reasons to believe that the situation may be different when the land is state‐owned. In such a context, land tenure arrangements can be precarious in guaranteeing security to the user (Rahmato, 1992), and any endogenous change in property rights may be blocked by the state (Joireman, 2001). Hence, others have emphasized the relative role of expected profits to farm level adoption and the maintenance of soil conservation practices (Place and Swallow, 2000).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Tenure security, resource poverty, public programs, and household plot‐level conservation investments in the highlands of northern Ethiopia

Hagos

Holden

2006

Agricultural Economics

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Land degradation poses a serious problem for the livelihoods of rural producers. Furthermore, there is rarely enough private investment taking place to commensurate the scale of the problem. This article examines the role of tenure insecurity, resource poverty, risk and time preferences, and community-led land conservation on differentiated patterns of household investment in land conservation in northern Ethiopia. We control for biophysical, household characteristics, market access conditions, and village level factors. Investments in soil bunds and stone terraces are specifically studied so as to capture the link between these various factors and the durability of conservation investments. We introduce the distinction between the determinants of the decision to invest and how much to invest in conservation. Regression results show that publicly led conservation programs seem to significantly stimulate private investment. A host of plot-level variables and household perceptions of returns on conservation investments, expressed in terms of perceived improvements in land quality and increased crop yields, were found to be critical to the decision to invest and intensify soil conservation. The evidence on the significance of households' attitudes toward risk aversion suggests the important role of risk and the household's risk-bearing capacity in the decision to intensify conservation measures. At the same time, tenure security indicators and households' resource endowments (resource poverty) had weaker effects in increasing willingness to invest and the level of investment made. The policy implications of these results point to the importance of agricultural research and extension efforts that target technologies which reduce household risk and poverty while enabling sustainable investments in conservation measures by individual households. Copyright 2006 International Association of Agricultural Economics.

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“…Contrary to the appellation of serfdom for these relations (Donham 1986;Joireman 2001), there is a sensible economic explanation for it. Tribute and service obligations of the southern gebbar were initially 'collective' rather than individual precisely because the imperial state lacked the administrative capacity to centralize the assessment and collection of tax obligations -especially in an empire whose size doubled in a matter of two decades.…”

Section: Some Illustrative Datamentioning

confidence: 92%

“…Furthermore, the possession of one's full entitlements to rist land depended crucially on one's ability to mount effective defence against a multitude of legitimate and illegitimate claimants, especially the titled overlord class. Investment in tenure claims, therefore, had handsome payoffs (Hoben 1973;Joireman 2001).…”

Section: Rist and Gultmentioning

confidence: 99%

Persistent Stasis in a Tributary Mode of Production: The Peasant Economy of Ethiopia

Abegaz¹

2005

J Agrarian Change

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The paradox of Ethiopia's agrarian economy is that, despite underwriting a world civilization, the transition to an industrial economy has eluded it. Using a model of Afro‐Asiatic tributarism, we attribute this outcome to endemic extractive contests between a predominantly landed peasantry and a titled, prebendary overlord class. The latter's strategy of political accumulation inevitably engendered immiserization of overlord and peasant alike by privileging diversion over production. The surplus was then dissipated on unproductive consumption, national defence and internecine strife. Lacking a strong state to mitigate predation and political instability, the Ethiopian peasant rationally ‘chose’ to be efficiently, albeit self‐sufficiently, poor.

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Property Rights and the Role of the State: Evidence from the Horn of Africa

Cited by 9 publications

References 14 publications

Policies, Interventions and Institutional Change in Pastoral Resource Management in Borana, Southern Ethiopia

Policies, Interventions and Institutional Change in Pastoral Resource Management in Borana, Southern Ethiopia

Tenure security, resource poverty, public programs, and household plot‐level conservation investments in the highlands of northern Ethiopia

Persistent Stasis in a Tributary Mode of Production: The Peasant Economy of Ethiopia

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