Proportional Representation in Lebanese Cabinets: An Unconstitutional Confessional Hierarchy?

Abstract

The confessional power-sharing mentality that governs the functioning of the Lebanese State apparatus has succeeded in imposing, over the years, many unwavering practices relating to the appointment of senior public officers. At the level of executive power, these confessional ‘constitutional conventions’ exacerbate the inequality between the different religious sects, where a de facto monopolisation within the so-called ‘Sovereign Ministries’ continues to be seen, ever since the Taif Agreement and reinforced by the Doha Accord. Furthermore, Lebanese parliamentary blocs fight to obtain ‘service ministries’, which are often an integral part of the machinery of clientelism, for the purpose of providing more ‘favours’ to their political clients. In fact, the political representation of the different religious confessions within the state institutions of deeply divided societies such as Lebanon, is ensured and guaranteed by the adoption of the principle of political proportionality. Following this logic, preserving the religious balance within the Lebanese Cabinet is one of the key prerequisites of the political system’s stability, which is essential to the functioning of the Council of Ministers. Prerogatives of the executive power are no longer concentrated in the hands of a single person belonging to a given religious confession, but are exercised through a collegial cabinet, which includes the main various Lebanese communities. Nevertheless, this proportionality, which sought a better representation of the religious segments, is mitigated by a hierarchy within the cabinet due to several unconstitutional practices.