Proposals for a Reformed System of Corporate Governance to Achieve Internationally Competitive Long‐Term Performance

Sykes, Allen

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198287889.003.0007

Cited by 5 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…In the context of larger businesses, Sykes (1994) has argued that this results (at least in part) from the diering systems of corporate governance in the UK, Japan and Germany. In particular, he perceives British industry as too frequently under pressure to achieve short-term results.…”

Section: Managerial and Policy Implicationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The short-term character of managerial solutions adopted by domestic ®rms has been contrasted with the long-term commitments which characterise Japanese business relationships (Kaplan, 1997;Kester, 1997). In the context of larger businesses, Sykes (1994) has argued that this results (at least in part) from the diering systems of corporate governance in the UK, Japan and Germany. In particular, he perceives British industry as too frequently under pressure to achieve short-term results.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Planning, business objectives and capital budgeting in Japanese, German and domestic SMEs: some evidence from the UK manufacturing sector

Peel

1999

Journal of Small Business and Enterprise Development

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The study of franchising as a small business growth strategy is only weakly researched and understood. This preliminary, qualitative investigation examines the experiences of 17 operational and five “failed” franchises in the UK, in translating their business concepts into a franchise format. It reveals that small firms select franchising as a growth strategy for both economic and idiosyncratic reasons, but that economic reasons tend to prevail. The findings suggest that franchising is a viable growth strategy for small firms and that per se it creates few major problems for growth‐oriented small businesses. It is argued that further research is needed, particularly into the experiences of “failed” franchises and into the problems encountered by growing small firms who do not adopt franchising as a growth strategy.

show abstract

Section: Managerial and Policy Implicationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Planning, business objectives and capital budgeting in Japanese, German and domestic SMEs: some evidence from the UK manufacturing sector

Peel

1999

Journal of Small Business and Enterprise Development

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…(2) This is as true of those who are fundamentally critical of current arrangements (e.g. Hutton, 1995) as of those who broadly support them (Cadbury, 1992); and is equally reflected in intermediate positions such as Charkham (1994) or Sykes (1994). (3) The hostility of General Motors' management in the 1980s to expressions of view by Ross Perot and the Californian Public Employees Retirement Scheme, the company's largest shareholders, illustrates the phenomenon very clearly; note equally however, that shareholder activism is mostly concerned with political rather than corporate issues.…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Corporate Governance

Kay¹,

Silberston²

1995

Natl. Inst. econ. rev.

112

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The Review is pleased to give hospitality to CLARE group articles, but is not necessarily in agreement with the views expressed; responsibility for these rests with the authors. Members of the CLARE Group are M.Both those who are critical of the current structure of corporate governance, and those who support it, share a common set of prenaises. The corporation is owned by its shareholders: managers exert power and responsibility on behalf of their shareholders: corporate governance is a question of effective accountability to shareholders. If there are problems, they should be dealt with by making these mechanisms more effective. This article challenges that view. The principal-agent model bears no relationship to the way large companies are actually run. The attempt to bring reality in line with the model is one possible road to reform: another is to adjust the model to reality. Shareholders do not own large companies, in any ordinary sense of the word own. Firms like BT or BP are social institutions, owned by nobody. The distinction between plc and the owner managed limited company should be real, and not just titular. Corporate managers are not the agents of the shareholders, but the trustees of the assets of the corporation, which include its reputation, its distinctive capabilities, and the skills of the employees and suppliers. Their objective should not be to maximise shareholder value but to further the interests of the business.This account is probably a better description of the current state of British company law than the principal-agent model, but we advocate a new company statute to put the matter beyond doubt. Disposing of the fiction that executives are the agents of shareholders allows us to establish an effective system for achieving the key goals of corporate governance: freedom for managers to manage, combined with real accountability for their performance. We advocate a fixed four-year term for company chief executives, involving a wide ranging and searching review of effectiveness which would involve not only directors and shareholders but advisors, associated companies and employees.

show abstract

Der Interne LBO als Unternehmensorganisation zur Lösung der Probleme der Publikums-Aktiengesellschaft

Scherer¹

1999

Interne Leveraged Buyouts

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Proposals for a Reformed System of Corporate Governance to Achieve Internationally Competitive Long‐Term Performance

Cited by 5 publications

References 0 publications

Planning, business objectives and capital budgeting in Japanese, German and domestic SMEs: some evidence from the UK manufacturing sector

Planning, business objectives and capital budgeting in Japanese, German and domestic SMEs: some evidence from the UK manufacturing sector

Corporate Governance

Der Interne LBO als Unternehmensorganisation zur Lösung der Probleme der Publikums-Aktiengesellschaft

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About