Proposals for Internationally Competitive Corporate Governance in Britain and America

Corporate governance: from accountability to enterprise

“…Gaved (1997) argues that fund managers have little time or resources to devote to active monitoring beyond that of under-performing stocks in which they are the largest shareholder. Hence, despite concentrated institutional share ownership, managers remain largely unmonitored (Berle, 1959;Sykes, 1994). An additional separation of ownership from control occurs at the shareholder level as the fund managers are often not direct beneficiaries of the increased revenues arising from exercising tighter control over corporate management.…”

Shareholding Versus Stakeholding: a critical review of corporate governance

“…Charkham, 1994;Sykes, 1994;Moreland, 1995) agrees with the principal-agent or finance model that the maximisation of shareholders' interests is the focus, it argues that the fundamental flaw of the Anglo-American corporate governance system is its excessive concern with short-term market value. Certain long-term expenditures, particularly capital investment and research and development spending, are systematically undervalued by the markets because of the immediate pressure or interest from hostile takeovers.…”

“…R&D investment) and competitive capacity of the corporation (e.g. Hayes and Abernathy, 1980;Charkham, 1994;Sykes, 1994;Moreland, 1995). It is argued that the stock market is not a good indicator of corporate performance because it is unable to cope with uncertainty and often misprices assets.…”

Corporate Governance and Pension Management in Nigeria

“…On this note, diligent managers respond to market forces by taking economic decisions that align with the prevailing share price or risk the threat of hostile takeover. This model sees short-term investment as a consequence of market failure (Charkham, 1994;Sykes, 1994 andBlair, 1995). The myopic model rests its argument on five basic assumptions: a.…”