2018
DOI: 10.7249/rr2267
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Prospective Outcome Assessment for Alternative Recruit Selection Policies

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Cited by 10 publications
(26 citation statements)
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“…We focus on 11B enlisted soldiers in the Army and use a DRM model estimated in Asch et al (2021) to simulate the cost of increasing 11B force size by increasing bonuses or accessions to restore the 0.2 percent reduction expected in Army enlisted strength shown in Table 5.1. Drawing from estimates in Orvis et al (2018), we assume that the average cost of recruiting and training a nonprior service Army recruit is $80,000 in 2019. 8 The DRM computes retention bonus costs as well as changes in compensation costs due to a change in the experience mix of the force (see Tong et al, 2021).…”
Section: Alternative Policies To Restore End Strength and Their Costmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…We focus on 11B enlisted soldiers in the Army and use a DRM model estimated in Asch et al (2021) to simulate the cost of increasing 11B force size by increasing bonuses or accessions to restore the 0.2 percent reduction expected in Army enlisted strength shown in Table 5.1. Drawing from estimates in Orvis et al (2018), we assume that the average cost of recruiting and training a nonprior service Army recruit is $80,000 in 2019. 8 The DRM computes retention bonus costs as well as changes in compensation costs due to a change in the experience mix of the force (see Tong et al, 2021).…”
Section: Alternative Policies To Restore End Strength and Their Costmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Furthermore, it is unclear which, if any, other recruit characteristics are effective at mitigating the riskiness associated with different waiver types. For example, Orvis et al, 2018, finds that Army accessions with and without weight waivers have similar outcomes in terms of first-term attrition, personnel actions (such as a bar to reenlistment), and separation for such reasons as physical condition and poor conduct. On the other hand, Army accessions with a drug and alcohol waiver (i.e., those who test positive for the presence of drugs or alcohol) are more likely to separate because of drug abuse or a serious offense, are more likely to have an adverse personnel action, and are more likely to fail to complete the first enlistment term than are similar accessions without a drug and alcohol waiver.…”
Section: Army Context and Emerging Societal Trendsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Conduct waivers might be for traffic or, primarily, nontraffic misdemeanors, although, in the past, a limited number of felony waivers were also granted. Medical waivers can be for height, weight, or, the lion's share, for a medical condition requiring a waiver to enlist (Orvis, Maerzluft, et al, 2018). The normal rate of medical waivers in the Army is on the order of 8 to 10 percent of accessions.…”
Section: Modeling the Relationship Between Recruiting Rate And Rmc/wamentioning
confidence: 99%