Protean Authentication Scheme – A Time-Bound Dynamic KeyGen Authentication Technique for IoT Edge Nodes in Outdoor Deployments

Abstract

The IoT edge/sensor nodes are exposed to large attack surface and could easily succumb to several well-known attacks in the wireless sensor network (WSN) domain. Authenticating edge nodes before they join a network, especially after a sleep state, is a critical step to maintain the overall trust of any given IoT local area network (IoT LAN). The low resources and computational constraints of such IoT nodes make this a challenging and non-trivial problem. As many IoT deployments are in uncontrolled environments, the IoT devices are often placed in the open so that physical access to them is inevitable. Due to easy physical access of the devices, common attacks, including cloning of devices or stealing secret keys stored in an edge node, are some of the most common attacks on the IoT deployments. This paper focuses on developing an extremely lightweight authentication scheme for constrained end-devices that are part of a given IoT LAN. Authentication occurs between the end-device and the gateway that acts as an edge computing device. The proposed authentication scheme is put through both formal and informal security verification. Voltage drop, current, and power are measured to gauge the overall impact of the security scheme. All the three parameters were measured while configuring the edge node as an end-device or as a router. Our testing results show that the impact on the resources was minimal.

A Robust Device-to-Device Continuous Authentication Protocol for the Internet of Things

“…However, it does not provide backward secrecy, and nor does it prevent DoS attacks from happening. Furthermore, the secret key for the sensor remains the same, rendering it vulnerable in cases where an attacker gains the key using a memory dump or any other process [40]. It is also vulnerable to an impersonation attack.…”

“…Thus, our protocol prevents all future sessions from being compromised, even in cases where the attacker has stolen the current secret key SK SN . Additionally, the protocol in [39] does not prevent impersonation [40] and does not consider mitigating DoS attacks. For Chuang et al's protocol [39], forward secrecy is only provided for partially in the token T K SN (continuous phase).…”

Optimized Load Centroid and Rabin Onion Secured Routing in Wireless Sensor Network for IoT

“…However, with the IoT edge nodes being exposed to different types of attacks, in [8], the focus was made on developing a lightweight authentication model for constrained end-devices, therefore ensuring security.…”

Framework for Secure Routing Towards Identifying and Resisting Complex Malicious Threats in IoT Ecosystem

“…With the increase in the number of IoT devices and applications, various security approaches have been introduced to make them more powerful and resilient against various attacks. The work carried out by Sathyadevan et al [15] introduced lightweight authentication mechanism IoT end-devices where gateway plays as a role of an edge computing node. The work of Shin et al [16] offered a route optimization scheme based on Distributed IP Mobility Management to offer a key exchange, interactive authentication, and privacy preservation.…”