2012
DOI: 10.1109/tmc.2011.32
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Protecting Location Privacy in Sensor Networks against a Global Eavesdropper

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Cited by 151 publications
(120 citation statements)
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“…The techniques described in [14] and [15] cannot protect against the global attacker. (2)Sink's location privacy protection A variety of approaches have been used for this purpose, such as fake message injection, randomization of forwarding delay, and use of fake sinks in order to hide the real sinks' positions [3,5,6,[23][24][25][26][27][28][29][30][31][32][33]. For example, Nezhad et al [24] proposed an anonymous topology discovery protocol where all nodes were allowed to forward route discovery messages and incoming/outgoing labels assigned to nodes.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…The techniques described in [14] and [15] cannot protect against the global attacker. (2)Sink's location privacy protection A variety of approaches have been used for this purpose, such as fake message injection, randomization of forwarding delay, and use of fake sinks in order to hide the real sinks' positions [3,5,6,[23][24][25][26][27][28][29][30][31][32][33]. For example, Nezhad et al [24] proposed an anonymous topology discovery protocol where all nodes were allowed to forward route discovery messages and incoming/outgoing labels assigned to nodes.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Although the inclusion of dummy sinks can protect a sensor network from local adversaries, it is not effective in the case of a global adversary, since global traffic analysis will allow the identification of all fake and real sinks, and the adversary can neutralize all of them. In [26], Mehta et al proposed to create multiple candidate traffic traces going to the established fake sinks in order to hide the traffic aggregating around real sinks. Similarly to [5], whenever a fake sink receives a packet and broadcasts it locally, it will make the attacker believe that a real sink could be in the range of the fake sink.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…The encrypted communication combined with the usage of dummy packets makes it impossible even for the global observer [24] to isolate the node initiating the communication session. Additionally, a session is never initiated at the MC as it can only request for a session to a MR.…”
Section: Anonymitymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, it should be seen that, the thoughts of security and credibility are orthogonal and large in adjusted transmission (with symmetric-key encryption for assurance protection and message approval codes for authenticity [7,8]. Regardless, these transitional points should not take any information about the last aggregate or individual data in a faultless arrangement.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%