Protecting Workers Abroad and Industries at Home: Rights-based Conditionality in Trade Preference Programs

Hafner-Burton, Emilie M.; Mosley, Layna; Galantucci, Robert

doi:10.1177/0022002718783236

Cited by 30 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 39 publications

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“…Drawing on this argument, developing countries have historically adopted a defensive stance towards the inclusion of LCs in PTAs (e.g., da Motta Veiga & Rios, 2008 ). International political economy scholarship lends credence to the claim that protectionist concerns in high-income countries play a significant role in the rise and governance of fair trade standards in PTAs (Hafner-Burton, 2009 ; Lechner, 2016 ; Postnikov & Bastiaens, 2020 ; see also Bastiaens & Postnikov, 2020 ; and Hafner-Burton et al, 2019 ).…”

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confidence: 99%

“…However, it is important to note that preferences are unilaterally given in the GSP, and therefore the determinants and impact of GSP programs follow a different logic. Focusing on the US GSP, Hafner-Burton et al ( 2019 ) find that rights-based considerations account for the maintenance of country-level trade benefits irrespective of import pressure while protectionist concerns drive suspensions from GSP eligibility at the product-level.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Labor clauses in trade agreements: Hidden protectionism?

2021

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We explore the impact of the introduction and design of labor clauses (LCs) in preferential trade agreements (PTAs) on bilateral trade flows over the period 1990–2014. While it is not a priori clear if the inclusion of LCs in PTAs will decrease or increase bilateral trade, we expect the direction of trade to matter, that is, we expect to observe the (negative or positive) impact of LCs in the South-North trade configuration. We also expect, in that configuration, stronger LCs to yield stronger (negative or positive) effects on bilateral trade flows. Using a novel dataset on the content of labor provisions in PTAs, we find in line with our first expectation that while the introduction of LCs has on average no impact on bilateral trade flows, it increases exports of low and middle-income countries with weaker labor standards in North–South trade agreements. Consistent with our second expectation, this positive impact is mostly driven by LCs with institutionalized cooperation provisions. In contrast, LCs with strong enforcement mechanisms do not have a statistically significant impact on exports of developing countries in North–South PTAs. The results are inconsistent with the ideas that LCs are set for protectionist reasons or have protectionist effects, casting doubt on the logic for the reluctance of many developing countries to include LCs in their trade agreements.

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confidence: 99%

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confidence: 99%

Labor clauses in trade agreements: Hidden protectionism?

2021

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“…Hence, this finding relates to research on 'rhetoric-efficacy' gaps in global human rights regimes (Hafner-Burton and Ron, 2007). In contrast, however, while narrowly defined human rights governance (e.g., abolition of torture) emphasizes government action, debates on sustainability throughout the global economy also highlight corporate conduct (Hafner-Burton, Mosley, and Galantucci, 2019). Accordingly, 'perceived insincerity' of supply chains policy could be akin to relatively widespread concerns about corporate 'greenwashing' (Kolcava, 2022).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 88%

Public Preference Formation Towards Sustainable Global Supply Chains Policy

Kolcava¹,

Smith²,

Bernauer³

2022

Preprint

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Effectively governing environmental and social externalities throughout the global economy poses challenges for democratic policy-makers in the court of public opinion. Following the median voter model, as the stringency of policy proposals increases, support rises amongst some citizens and falls amongst others. We argue informational disclosure-based governance presents a potential strategy to mitigate this zero-sum logic as citizens discount policy costs while expecting substantive benefits. We focus on political efforts to increase sustainability throughout global supply chains, drawing on two original survey experiments with representative samples in the 12 largest high-income importing economies (N=24,000). Indeed, at higher levels of policy stringency, citizens expect greater benefits than costs. Further, we find that expected benefits are more strongly associated with support than costs. Lastly, we note how policy stringency promotes convergence of expected benefits across the political ideological spectrum. Hence, our findings provide insights into public preference formation towards the globalization-sustainability nexus.

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“…Third, these treaties provided for nonbinding mediation between states should these commitments not be met, but not for any binding sanctions on violating states (Smith et al 2020). Moreover, importing states were rarely willing to initiate disputes over labor violations, giving rise to concerns that the main function of labor chapters was as a symbolic concession to domestic protectionists (Hafner-Burton, Mosley, and Galantucci 2019).…”

Section: Global Perspectivesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Globalizing Regulation: A New Progressive Agenda for Trade and Investment

Atal

2022

Global Perspectives

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The past two decades have witnessed growing concern about the challenges governments face in regulating multinational corporations. Trade and investment agreements play a crucial role in setting the regulatory regime that governs these transnational activities. The multilateral trade and investment regime has been experiencing a period of crisis, with the collapse of proceedings at the World Trade Organization’s appellate body and the failure of the Doha Development Round. During this period, states have turned to unilateral, bilateral and regional channels in lieu of multilateral progress. Bilateral and regional agreements contain a much higher degree of regulatory coordination among members, including a growing number of binding standards on labor, the environment and human rights which apply to multinational corporations operating across the trading blocs. This paper reviews three cases of states, or groups of states, endeavoring to impose binding regulation on multinational corporations through the trade and investment regime. This paper argues, that these efforts, while partial, form the basis for a new multilateral trade and investment regime that holds corporations accountable. It shows that during the multilateral system’s period of crisis, as states in both the Global North and Global South have pursued their own strategies and shown a shared commitment to increasing their regulatory capacity, the policy consensus among practitioners at the multilateral level has shifted towards accommodating these efforts. Together, this paper argues, these developments lay the groundwork for a new multilateral model of trade and corporate accountability.

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Protecting Workers Abroad and Industries at Home: Rights-based Conditionality in Trade Preference Programs

Cited by 30 publications

References 39 publications

Labor clauses in trade agreements: Hidden protectionism?

Labor clauses in trade agreements: Hidden protectionism?

Public Preference Formation Towards Sustainable Global Supply Chains Policy

Globalizing Regulation: A New Progressive Agenda for Trade and Investment

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