2008
DOI: 10.1109/tc.2008.107
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Protection Circuit against Differential Power Analysis Attacks for Smart Cards

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
2
1
1
1

Citation Types

1
22
0

Year Published

2008
2008
2021
2021

Publication Types

Select...
5
2
2

Relationship

2
7

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 41 publications
(23 citation statements)
references
References 11 publications
1
22
0
Order By: Relevance
“…The main difference is that our application requires a current waveform between clock periods as identical as possible, while imperfections in cryptographic hardware can be compensated with other techniques such as random masking [41] and current flattening [42]. The proposed approach does also differ from the methods discussed in the previous section, which focus on reducing SSN in the time domain, while this work focuses on reducing SSN in the frequency domain.…”
Section: Noise Reduction Methodsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The main difference is that our application requires a current waveform between clock periods as identical as possible, while imperfections in cryptographic hardware can be compensated with other techniques such as random masking [41] and current flattening [42]. The proposed approach does also differ from the methods discussed in the previous section, which focus on reducing SSN in the time domain, while this work focuses on reducing SSN in the frequency domain.…”
Section: Noise Reduction Methodsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The DPA attack is used to reduce the noise performance [10], but it is important to investigate other strategies leading to further reduction in the amount of noise. Noise can be classified as External, Internal, and Quantization.…”
Section: Noise Analysis Attackmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In [13] the resistance of a current flattening circuit against DPA attack has been investigated. Thousands current traces were collected at the supply pin of a standard 8-bit microcontroller (ATmega 16L) executing DES encryption.…”
Section: Designmentioning
confidence: 99%