Protective Excise Taxation

Abstract

Forthcoming in the Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, 2017. Abstract:In a small open economy composed of unionised international Cournot-Nash duopolies, a self-interested government has unilateral incentives to set higher specific domestic excise duties under the destination principle when the typical foreign firm is dominant and the import-competing sector is small. Excise taxes may emerge in political equilibrium when domestic firms and unions lobby for protection and the government is unable to use alternative protective policies because of international agreements. In so far as the government is prepared to exchange tax revenues for political contributions, under some conditions the excise tax rate will be higher than the one chosen without lobbying.

Implementation of Retail Selling Price Tariff Policy in Order to Increase Cigarette Excise Revenue at Kppbc Pasar Baru North Jakarta in 2022

“…In determining the CHT, the Minister of Finance said that the government prepared excise instruments by considering a number of aspects ranging from agricultural labor to the cigarette industry (Santoni, 2017). In addition, the government is also paying attention to the target of reducing the prevalence of smoking among children aged 10-18 years to 8.7 percent as stated in This consumption even exceeds protein consumption such as eggs and chicken.…”