Protective Legislation and Part‐time Employment in Britain

Abstract

This paper analyses the likely impact of a proposed European Community Directive on part‐time work, on part‐time employment in Britain. The provisions of the Directive, which extends to part‐time employees a number of legal rights currently only available to full‐time employees, are contrasted with the complex and somewhat arbitrary present state of the law in Britain in the area of regulating part‐time work. The impact is examined by testing models which identify the determinants of the supply and demand for part‐time employees. The tests suggest that existing regulations have indeed affected the manner in which part‐time employees are utilised but that there is no evidence that the present partial protective legislation has reduced the level of part‐time employment. Government opposition to the Directive on such grounds may therefore be unfounded.

Workforce Restructuring, Social Insurance Coverage and the Black Economy

“…On the contrary, economists routinely and unquestioningly incorporate it as a basic premise of their models and explanations for employers' use of such workers. The point is made even by reseachers who are unable to find any evidence that employers deliberately keep hours of work beneath the 16 hours threshold and despite the solid evidence that women generally prefer less than full-time hours, that most part-timers are content with their hours of work, and that women need to be strongly advised not to accept the temptation of working fewer than 16 hours a week or restricting their earnings to less than the NI threshold (Select Committee on the European Communities, 1982;Disney and Szyszczak, 1984;Martin and Roberts, 474 Catherine Hakim 1984, p.41;Humphries, 1986, p.37;Beechey and Perkins, 1987, p.155;Wallace, 1984a, 1984b). In addition, part-time workers are usually classified in the secondary labour market by sociologists (see for example Barron and Norris, 1976;Loveridge, 1983, p.160).…”

“…For example, it is often said that lower unit labour costs, or lower non-wage costs, are a key reason for the expansion of part-time work in recent decades (Blanchflower and Corry, 1987, pp.3-4;Mallier and Rosser, 1987, pp.141-145). Inevitably, lawyers focus instead on enumerating the legal rights and benefits of full-time workers which are not available (or less securely available) to their part-time colleagues (Leighton, 1986;Disney and Szyszczak, 1984; see also Szyszczak, 1986). It is argued that if weekly hours of work peak just below the 16 hours limit, or below the level at which NI contributions become payable, this is most commonly due to employers' rather than workers' preferences.…”

“…It is argued that if weekly hours of work peak just below the 16 hours limit, or below the level at which NI contributions become payable, this is most commonly due to employers' rather than workers' preferences. The point is made even by reseachers who are unable to find any evidence that employers deliberately keep hours of work beneath the 16 hours threshold and despite the solid evidence that women generally prefer less than full-time hours, that most part-timers are content with their hours of work, and that women need to be strongly advised not to accept the temptation of working fewer than 16 hours a week or restricting their earnings to less than the NI threshold (Select Committee on the European Communities, 1982;Disney and Szyszczak, 1984;Martin and Roberts, 1984, p.41;Humphries, 1986, p.37;Beechey and Perkins, 1987, p.155;Wallace, 1984a, 1984b). Overall both economists and sociologists have displayed relatively little concern to test or prove what are in fact strong assumptions.…”

“…Overall both economists and sociologists have displayed relatively little concern to test or prove what are in fact strong assumptions. Inevitably, lawyers focus instead on enumerating the legal rights and benefits of full-time workers which are not available (or less securely available) to their part-time colleagues (Leighton, 1986;Disney and Szyszczak, 1984; see also Szyszczak, 1986).…”

SHORT‐TIME WORKING AND THE UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFIT SYSTEM IN GREAT BRITAIN*

“…If there are greater adjustment costs on employees, such as the introduction of employment protection legislation, then it is to be expected, ceteris paribus, there will be a greater short-run variation in hours; for example, see Disney and Szyszczak (1983). The Employment Protection Act 1975 which came into effect on 1 February 1977 introduced a statutory scheme of guarantee pay (Szyszczak, 1984) which passed the cost of the first five days of short-time working (in a period of three months) directly over to employers, thus relieving the unemployment benefit system of shorttime payments made during periods covered by such awards. Liability was further discharged because days for which these guarantee payments had been made did not count towards the three waiting days which had to be served before unemployment benefit for short-time could be paid.…”