Protest, Deterrence, and Escalation: The Strategic Calculus of Government Repression

Abstract

The theoretical literature on government repression has mostly taken a choice theoretic perspective, wherein either the protest group optimally chooses a protest tactic in response to government behavior or the government optimally chooses a repression strategy. This approach is insufficient for capturing the strategic nature of protest and repression. The theoretical shortcomings of this approach are reflected in contradictory empirical findings on the effects of repression on dissent. The article develops an extensive strategic game between the government and an opposition group that allows one to identify the conditions for successful deterrence or protest. Introducing incomplete information and a third-party threat additionally produces equilibria with repression and escalating violence. The model produces novel testable hypotheses that shed new light on the effect of repression on dissent, the likelihood of violence, and the possibility of a coup. Implications for the domestic democratic peace and “murder in the middle” hypothesis are drawn.

Treaties, Tenure, and Torture: The Conflicting Domestic Effects of International Law

“…Following Pierskalla (2010), we present a theory that endogenizes repression and dissent for committed and uncommitted states to yield predictions as to how treaties affect the incentives to repress under the expectation that changes will also impact the decisions of groups to mobilize. If the expectation of costs resulting from the international obligation will constrain leaders from violating rights, this alters citizens' incentives to mobilize, which in turn effects repression choices.…”

The Arab Spring, Winter, and Back Again? (Re)Introducing the Dissent-Repression Nexus with a Twist

“…As described above, the answer is no. Indeed, these patterns fit directly in line with what is commonly referred to as the "Dissent-Repression Nexus"-a body of work extending over four decades that seeks to rigorously explore what challengers do against governments as well as what political authorities do against those that challenge them (e.g., Davenport 1995;2007a;Francisco 1995;Gurr 1970;Lichbach 1987;Moore 1998;Pierskalla 2010;Shellman 2006;Tilly 1978). No one who studies political conflict and violence would be surprised that prior authoritarianism and repression-something that we can think of as an Arab Winter, would later prompt desires for change and popular uprisings-the Arab Spring.…”

Human Rights Violations, Weak States, and Civil War

“…Pierskalla (2010), for instance, does not test the implications of his model empirically. Mason and Krane (1989) present a case study of the civil war in El Salvador but no large-N tests.…”

“…Governments use indiscriminate repression when they do not have the "institutional machinery, redistributable resources, and political inclination" to accommodate opposition demands (Mason and Krane 1989:184). Pierskalla (2010) develops a strategic game to illustrate how under certain conditions-incomplete information or a third-party threat, such as from the military -government repression can lead to an escalation from conflict to full-blown civil war. Semi-democratic regimes, which are neither fully authoritarian nor democratic but mix elements of both, should also be at a higher risk of experiencing civil war onset following government repression, according to his model.…”