Protests, Regulations and Environmental Accountability in Cambodia

Abstract

In the realm of global environmental governance, accountability has been key to the debate concerning pervasive environmental deterioration. Among the factors underlying this deterioration, a perceived challenge is the lack of clear mechanisms for identifying to whom the actors in environmental governance in general, and in other sectors, for example, hydropower, agricultural land, mining, and infrastructure in particular, are accountable to for their actions. To investigate the challenge of this situation, this article explores the ways in which the protest movements of grassroots communities and nongovernmental organizations endeavour to hold government and foreign corporations accountable for the actions they have taken which have contributed to environmental degradation in Cambodia. Drawing on two case studies, this article argues that these protest movements have played an increasing role in requiring environmental accountability from both government and corporations.

Review of the research on hydropolitics in Cambodia

“…I want to inform you that I am mindful of the difference between economic benefits and environmental impacts” (Radio Free Asia, February 24, 2015). Hun Sen also said, “the dam construction in the Cheay Areng valley cannot proceed without proper feasibility and environmental impact assessment” (Young, 2019, p. 44). The interesting discovery here is that the SCAD is just coincidentally omitted in Blake's Chinese‐dam list (Blake, 2019, pp.…”

Citizens of photography: visual activism, social media and rhetoric of collective action in Cambodia

“…The Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC) has introduced agricultural commodification policies which aim at exploiting the remaining resources--the forest, in particular--to meet the new market demands and with the added intent of enabling rural employment and poverty reduction. In 2005, the RGC issued sub-decree 146 on ELCs (economic land concessions), by which foreign investors could obtain access to land or natural resource concessions for up to 99 years (recently reduced to around 50 years); and million hectares of land were granted to both foreign and domestic investors, including joint ventures, under ELC scheme (Young 2019b).…”

“…Forthcoming in South East Asia Research 25 the era of smartphone cameras to x-ray or capture the corruption of and loopholes in the state's environmental protection policies. Such photography and videography help provide documentary evidence of the poachers and illegal loggers for use in testifying against illegal and criminal activities and helps to protect the patrollers and the community members from being intimidated or threatened by these criminals.21 Through these they can also hold the state and corporations accountable for their environmental deterioration actions (Young 2019b). Hence, the under-represented and weak indigenous communities in Prey Lang, essentially similar to what are called non-citizens by Azoulay (2008; are immeasurably aided by the democratisation of smartphone cameras and social media.…”

CSO Networks and Resistance to Forced Displacement in Cambodia

“…The negative impacts or potential negative impacts of development lead some communities to resist development projects, which has resulted in protracted development-related conflicts in many instances (Corbera et al, 2017;Schoenberger et al, 2017). While protracted conflict is relatively common, effective community resistance is less common and resolutions of these conflicts which communities consider to be more equitable are relatively rare (Baird, 2017;Beban et al, 2017;Dell'Angelo et al, 2021;Diepart et al, 2019;Hall et al, 2015;Hunsberger et al, 2017;Joshi, 2020;McAllister, 2015;Weeber, 2016;Young, 2019). Barriers to and costs of resistance are high for community members (Ear, 2013;Hughes and Un, 2011a).…”

“…As a result, solutions are typically imposed on communities rather than being mutually agreed on by parties (Chan and Pun, 2020;Dell'Angelo et al, 2021;Li, 2007;Ngin and Verkoren, 2015). This is particularly salient in Cambodia, where contestation is socially and politically discouraged and social mobilization has been increasingly harshly repressed in recent years (Hughes, 2008;Joshi, 2020;Vichea, 2015Vichea, , 2016aYoung, 2019). Furthermore, Cambodia lacks a strong tradition of organized civil society and the concept of civil society itself has been contentious in the country, which impacts effectiveness of CSOs and resolution of development-related conflicts (Brickell and Springer, 2017;Ear, 2013;Hughes, 2020;Ou and Kim, 2013;Rose-Jensen, 2019).…”