Prototypes and conceptual analysis

Ramsey, William

doi:10.1007/bf00768299

Cited by 91 publications

(49 citation statements)

References 25 publications

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“…Philosophers have started to recognize these problems in these other areas, and I wish to raise some of these same concerns for the function debate (cf. Ramsey 1992, DePaul and Ramsey 1998, Brown 1999, Stitch 1998.…”

Section: Ill Conceptual Analysis and Its Problemsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…One set stems from inadequacies of the "classic conception of concepts," the idea that concepts can be represented by a short list of relatively simple criteria for their application (Ramsey 1992). Psychologists have found that speakers do not appear to apply concepts according to a set of individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions (cf.…”

Section: Ill Conceptual Analysis and Its Problemsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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An Alternative to Conceptual Analysis in the Function Debate

Schwartz

2004

Monist

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Section: Ill Conceptual Analysis and Its Problemsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Ill Conceptual Analysis and Its Problemsmentioning

confidence: 99%

An Alternative to Conceptual Analysis in the Function Debate

Schwartz

2004

Monist

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“…But these ways of defining the project rest on problematic assumptions about the nature of meaning (Millikan 1989) or the sort of criteria that speakers generally apply (Ramsey 1992). There is little question that in attempting to clarify and define concepts, we change them (Schwartz 2004(Schwartz , 2007.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…I have significant qualms about this general project, as do others, especially involving imaginary cases where "intuitions" are questionable (cf. Ramsey 1992;Schwartz 2004Schwartz , 2007. See further discussion in Section 7 below.…”

Section: Problems With Including Toomentioning

confidence: 99%

Defining Dysfunction: Natural Selection, Design, and Drawing a Line

Schwartz¹

2007

Philos. of Sci.

123

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Accounts of the concepts of function and dysfunction have not adequately explained what factors determine the line between low-normal function and dysfunction. I call the challenge of doing so the line-drawing problem. Previous approaches emphasize facts involving the action of natural selection (Wakefield 1992a(Wakefield , 1999a(Wakefield , 1999b or the statistical distribution of levels of functioning in the current population (Boorse 1977(Boorse , 1997. I point out limitations of these two approaches and present a solution to the line-drawing problem that builds on the second one.A Case. Mr. Smith is a 70-year-old man being admitted to the hospital with congestive heart failure (CHF). He had a heart attack a few years ago, followed by a procedure that reopened a blocked coronary artery. He did well since then, and tests showed that his "ejection fraction," the amount of blood his heart pushes out in each contraction, remained around 50%, down from the average of 60% but still in the normal range.Over the last few weeks, he has developed increasing shortness of breath, and tests show that his ejection fraction has dropped to 20%. This reduction in his heart's pumping ability is causing fluid to leak out of the veins in his lungs, causing his trouble breathing. Possible causes of his heart failure range from another heart attack to valvular problems or other issues. *Received January 2005; revised May 2007. †To contact the author, please write to: Indiana University Center for Bioethics, 410 W. 10th Street, Suite 3100, Indianapolis, IN 46202; e-mail: phschwar@iupui.edu. ‡Thanks to Christopher Boorse, Randall Dipert, Gary Ebbs, Gary Hatfield, Harold Kincaid, Eric Meslin, Shari Rudavsky, and Alfred Tauber for conversation and encouragement regarding my work on these issues. Thanks to two anonymous reviewers for Philosophy of Science for critique and questions that significantly contributed to the final product. Thanks also to audiences at

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“…Even if we have a valid interest in articulating the boundaries of jurisprudential concepts reliance on intuitions is worrisome, 10 See also Harman (1994); Stich (1992, pp. 246-50); Ramsey (1992), all works informed by findings of psychologists.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Jurisprudence and Psychology

Priel

2011

New Waves in Philosophy of Law

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I argue that much of the work in analytic jurisprudence has been concerned with two questions that have not been adequately distinguished: (a) an inquiry about the concept of law, and (b) an explanation of the important features of the practice of law. It is often assumed that the two inquiries are the same. In this essay I distinguish the two and argue that work in psychology provides important insights about both. With regard to the first, I argue that much jurisprudential conceptual analysis is challenged by psychological work on concepts. With regard to the second, I argue that legal theorists would benefit from greater attention to what people's 'internal' attitudes about law are by looking at psychological research on the matter. But psychology is not merely a challenge to contemporary jurisprudence: following the critique I suggest various ways psychological work can assist us in thinking on old jurisprudential questions like the dispute between positivism and natural law or the question of law's normativity.

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Prototypes and conceptual analysis

Cited by 91 publications

References 25 publications

An Alternative to Conceptual Analysis in the Function Debate

An Alternative to Conceptual Analysis in the Function Debate

Defining Dysfunction: Natural Selection, Design, and Drawing a Line

Jurisprudence and Psychology

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