Provably Secure Untraceable Electronic Cash against Insider Attacks

Abstract

Although a great deal of research has been done on electronic cash schemes with blind multisignatures to prevent an insider attack, there is no discussion of a formal security model in the literature. Firstly we discussed the security model of e-cash schemes based on the blind multisignature scheme against a (restricted) attack model and proposed a concrete scheme proven to be secure in the model [1]; however, this attack model disallows an attacker from corrupting an issuing bank and shops in the forgery game. In this paper, first, we reconsider the security model to remove the restriction of the attack model. Second, we propose a new untraceable e-cash scheme with a blind multisignature scheme and prove that the proposed scheme is secure against the (non-restricted) attacks under the DDH assumption in the random oracle model. key words: blind multisignature, electronic cash, provable security, random oracle model, insider attacks

ID-Based Multi-Signature Scheme in Electronic Communication

“…In 1987, Fiat and Shamir proposed an IBS scheme [2] based on integer factorization problem. Also, there are many implementations based on the Fiat-Shamir scheme (such as [3], [4] and [5]).…”