Proving a State’s Involvement in a Cyber-Attack: Evidentiary Standards before the ICJ

Brunner, Isabella; Dobrić, Marija; Pirker, Verena

doi:10.5040/9781509927180.0006

Cited by 1 publication

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“…2) as an exercise of the right of self-defence, or 3) as a reaction out of necessity. Given that most cyber operations happen below the threshold of an armed attack 6 (only in case of the latter would a state be able to respond in self-defence 7 ), it makes sense to take a look at countermeasures first before addressing self-defensive measures. "Necessity" as a response option should be seen as a last resort, given the high threshold and non-reliance on attribution (on these criteria, see in detail below).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Malicious Cyber Operations, “Hackbacks” and International Law: An Austrian Example as a Basis for Discussion on Permissible Responses

Schweighofer

Brunner

Zanol

2020

MUJLT

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In January 2020, Austria publicly announced that some of its governmental institutions have been hit by a significant malicious cyber operation and that it cannot be denied – at least for the moment – that a state was behind this operation. One month later, the Austrian Foreign Ministry declared the cyber operation to be officially over. While Austria noted that it took “countermeasures” against the operation, it is not entirely clear what it meant by that. This article elaborates the question what response options a state like Austria would have against a malicious cyber operation under the current framework of international law. It, hence, tries to answer when a “hackback” is lawful under international law and when it is not.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%