Proving that the Mind Is Not a Machine?

Abstract

This piece continues the tradition of arguments by John Lucas, Roger Penrose and others to the effect that the human mind is not a machine. Kurt Gödel thought that the intensional paradoxes stand in the way of proving that the mind is not a machine. According to Gödel, a successful proof that the mind is not a machine would require a solution to the intensional paradoxes. We provide what might seem to be a partial vindication of Gödel and show that if a particular solution to the intensional paradoxes is adopted, one can indeed give an argument to the effect that the mind is not a machine.

Gaps, gluts, and theoretical equivalence

“…Penrose wasn't careful in calibrating the exact list of principles of truth employed in the argument. This task has been recently taken up by logicians and philosophers (Koellner, 2018;Stern, 2018). In particular, Stern analyzes Penrose's argument by formalizing it in KF + CONS: he shows that mechanism can be refuted in KF + CONS, although this refutation cannot fall into the extension of the truth predicate of KF + CONS (as we have seen, this pattern is quite common in KF + CONS).…”

Hypatia's silence

“…This theory is philosophically indeed remarkably strong. Stern has recently shown that this theory proves the elusive conclusion of the Lucas‐Penrose argument, i.e., that the human mind is not a formal system [Stern 2018]. Yet Stern (rightly) does not in any way take this argument as a justification of the conclusion that the mind is not a Turing machine.…”

Proving that the Mind Is Not a Machine?

“…In Stern, , the grant number for the Marie Sklodowska‐Curie Individual Fellowship was published with error in the Acknowledgments.…”