Proxy agents, auxiliary forces, and sovereign defection: assessing the outcomes of using non-state actors in civil conflicts

Abstract

This article interrogates the role of non-state armed actors in the Ukrainian civil conflict. The aim of this article is twofold. First, it seeks to identify the differences between the patterns of military intervention in Crimea (direct, covert intervention), and those in the SouthEast (mixed direct and indirectproxyintervention). It does so by assessing the extent of Russian troop involvement and that of external sponsorship to non-state actors. Second, it puts forward a tentative theoretical framework that allows distinguishing between the different outcomes the two patterns of intervention generate. Here, the focus is on the role of non-state actors in the two interventionist scenarios. The core argument is that the use of non-state actors is aimed at sovereign defection. The article introduces the concept of sovereign defection and defines it as a break-away from an existing state. To capture the differences between the outcomes of the interventions in Crimea and SouthEast , sovereign defection is classified into two categories: inward and outward. Outward sovereign defection is equated to the territorial seizure of the Crimean Peninsula by Russian Special Forces, aided by existing criminal gangs acting in an auxiliary capacity. Inward sovereign defection refers to the external sponsorship of the secessionist rebels in SouthEast Ukraine and their use as proxy forces with the purpose of creating a political buffer-zone in the shape of a frozen conflict. To demonstrate these claims, the article analyses the configuration of the dynamics of violence in both regions. It effectively argues that, in pursuing sovereign defection, the auxiliary and proxy forces operate under two competing dynamics of violence, delegative and non-delegative, with distinct implications to the course and future of the conflict. Keywords Proxy war proxy agent auxiliary force Ukraine sovereign defection civil war Accounts of the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula to the Russian Federation in March 2014 emphasized primarily its swift character (Snegovaya 2015), while pointing towards the coming of age of a shift in Russian contemporary warfare (Karber 2015) that had been on its way since the move towards what Major-General Vladimir Slipchenko called 'sixth generation of warfare' (Kipp 2012). Serhiy Kunitsayn, the ex-premier of Crimea and former Permanent Representative of the President of Ukraine to Crimea, recalls to have been the last bulwark of the legitimate Ukrainian Government there at the time: I came to the office of the Crimean union of Afghan war veterans, where we decided to stand as a shield between the Russian and Ukrainian troops, and half an hour later the building was blocked and Aksyonov's 1 bands led by the 'green men' began to storm it. (Kunitsyn 2014) What started as protests in late November 2013 (Grytsenko and Walker 2013), and escalated into violent demonstrations over the course of the following months (Kramer and Higgins 2014), effectively turned into an internationalized civil war 2 with the annexation of Crimea...

Towards a typology of non-state actors in ‘hybrid warfare’: proxy, auxiliary, surrogate and affiliated forces

“…Concerning the military dimension, the hybrid operations combined Russian Special Forces and local self-defence militias. The latter played 'largely an auxiliary role' (Galeotti 2016, 284-295;Rauta 2016), and as such represent the first type of regular-irregular relationship: auxiliary.…”

“…It also adds more specificity to comparisons with 'compound warfare' understood as the intentional and simultaneous use of regular main force with dispersed irregular forces (Huber 2002). 'Auxiliary' moves beyond the point of synergy to capture a wider remit of kinetic purposes (Rauta 2016), whose battlefield impact is the result of strategic combination and coordination.…”

“…If Crimea was to be part of the Russian Federation, the South-East was to be transformed into a frozen conflict much like the one in Transnistria. This translated in the role and relationship to non-state actors as well: their role was not just military as it was with the auxiliaries, but also politico-strategic (Rauta 2016). As opposed to a covert direct military intervention, Russia waged an indirect, proxy war.…”

“…The case study choice is informed by the article's attempt at theory-building through typological developments (George and Bennett 2005, 238). The 'little green men', the separatist forces in the south east of Ukraine, the crowdfunding of Ukrainian volunteer battalions fighting to quash shadowy operations by Russian forces, private military contractors, and mercenaries, all obfuscated analytical categories as well as our ability to map their in situ relationships (Bowen 2019;Spearin 2018;Galeotti 2016;Malyarenko and Galbreath 2016;Rauta 2016). Given this variation, a typology becomes an apt tool of management of phenomena complexity, working best in within case study scenarios (Gerring 2004, 92).…”

Indirect Governance at War: Delegation and Orchestration in Rebel Support

“…Rather than attacking other states directly, governments often rely on indirect warfare by supporting a rebel group’s fight against an adversarial government (Salehyan 2010, 494). 1 Take as examples the Russian government’s support for the separatists in Eastern Ukrainian against their central government (Rauta 2016) as well as the United States (US) government’s sponsorship of Kurdish rebels inter alia against the Assad government in Syria (Byman 2013, 906-7; Cragin 2015). Indeed, while direct war between states has become rare, the fight between factions within states has been the dominant type of conflict since 1945 (Melander, Pettersson, and Themnér 2016), with roughly half of rebel groups receiving external support by foreign governments (D.…”