PSA Applied to the Design of Non-Nuclear Plants

Paltrinieri, Nicola; Hauge, Stein; Dionísio, Mirian Carla Rosse; Nelson, William E.

doi:10.1201/b15938-293

Cited by 7 publications

(16 citation statements)

References 1 publication

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“…Such approach is also inspired to the aforementioned Risk Barometer [22][23][24] and TEC2O [25]. For this reason, the main model elements (status of causes and performance of barriers) are defined by means of indicators, as explained in table 1.…”

Section: Loss Of Containmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Sand formation may lead to potential erosion and corrosion of oil pipelines. For this reason, several typologies of safety barriers may be employed, as shown by Paltrinieri et al [33].…”

Section: Oil Platforms With High Sand Productionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Generally, the acoustic sand detector is used for dynamic Corrosive environment and sand under deposit may be another cause of pipeline material degradation -in this case corrosion. The gravel pack is again indicated by Paltrinieri et al [33] as safety barrier because it can prevent sand production and sand deposit where the flow is slowed down by line bends. Injection of appropriate chemicals into the fluids in order to inhibit corrosion (chemical treatment) is another safety barrier defined to prevent corrosive environment, which is itself composed by technical and operational measures, such as the equipment used and its management.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Other safety barriers can be employed to mitigate material degradation [33]. Erosion corrosion allowance may be considered present for the pipeline wall thickness.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Frequency modification factors address site-specific elements related to the facility under review [13,21] and may be updated in (quasi) real-time. The Risk Barometer is a representative example of such approach [22][23][24]. …”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Real-Time Data for Risk Assessment in the Offshore Oil and Gas Industry

Paltrinieri

Landucci

Rossi

2017

Volume 3B: Structures, Safety and Reliability

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Recent major accidents in the offshore oil and gas (O&G) industry have showed inadequate assessment of system risk and demonstrated the need to improve risk analysis. While direct causes often differ, the failure to update risk evaluation on the basis of system changes/modifications has been a recurring problem. Risk is traditionally defined as a measure of the accident likelihood and the magnitude of loss, usually assessed as damage to people, to the environment, and/or economic loss. Recent revisions of such definition include also aspects of uncertainty. However, Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) in the offshore O&G industry is based on consolidated procedures and methods, where periodic evaluation and update of risk is not commonly carried out. Several methodologies were recently developed for dynamic risk analysis of the offshore O&G industry. Dynamic fault trees, Markov chain models for the lifecycle analysis, and Weibull failure analysis may be used for dynamic frequency evaluation and risk assessment update. Moreover, dynamic risk assessment methods were developed in order to evaluate the risk by updating initial failure probabilities of events (causes) and safety barriers as new information are made available. However, the mentioned techniques are not widely applied in the common O&G offshore practice due to several reasons, among which their complexity has a primary role. More intuitive approaches focusing on a selected number of critical factors have also been suggested, such as the Risk Barometer or the TEC2O. Such techniques are based on the evaluation of technical, operational and organizational factors. The methodology allows supporting periodic update of QRA by collecting and aggregating a set of indicators. However, their effectiveness relies on continuous monitoring activity and realtime data capturing. For this reason, this contribution focuses on the coupling of such methods with sensors of different nature located in or around and offshore O&G system. The inheritance from the Centre for Integrated Operations in the Petroleum Industries represents the basis of such study. Such approach may be beneficial for several cases in which (quasi) real-time risk evaluation may support critical operations. Two representative cases have been described: i) erosion and corrosion issues due to sand production; and ii) oil production in environmental sensitive areas. In both the cases, dynamic risk analysis may employ real-time data provided by sand, corrosion and leak detectors. A simulation of dynamic risk analysis has demonstrated how the variation of such data can affect the overall risk picture. In fact, this risk assessment approach has not only the capability to continuously iterate and outline improved system risk pictures, but it can also compare its results with sensor-measured data and allow for calibration. This can potentially guarantee progressive improvement of the method reliability for appropriate support to safety-critical decisions. Direct causes of such events often differed, but...

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Section: Loss Of Containmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Sand formation may lead to potential erosion and corrosion of oil pipelines. For this reason, several typologies of safety barriers may be employed, as shown by Paltrinieri et al [33].…”

Section: Oil Platforms With High Sand Productionmentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Other safety barriers can be employed to mitigate material degradation [33]. Erosion corrosion allowance may be considered present for the pipeline wall thickness.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

Real-Time Data for Risk Assessment in the Offshore Oil and Gas Industry

Paltrinieri

Landucci

Rossi

2017

Volume 3B: Structures, Safety and Reliability

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Improving safety of DP operations: learning from accidents and incidents during offshore loading operations

Dong

Vinnem

Utne

2017

EURO Journal on Decision Processes

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The risk caused by DP vessels in offshore marine operations is not negligible, due to wide applications of DP vessels in complex marine operations, and the sharp increase of DP vessel population. The DP accidents/incidents on the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS) that have occurred after 2000 indicate a need for improving safety of DP operations, which calls for new risk reduction measures. The focus of this paper is particularly on the offshore loading operations with DP shuttle tanker in offloading from Floating Production Storage and Offloading (FPSO) vessels on the NCS, but the results may be relevant also for other types of DP vessels in offshore oil and gas operations. In the paper, Man, Technology and Organization (MTO) analysis is applied to investigate the causes and barrier failures of nine reported accidents/incidents occurring over a 16-year period (2000)(2001)(2002)(2003)(2004)(2005)(2006)(2007)(2008)(2009)(2010)(2011)(2012)(2013)(2014)(2015). MTO is based on three methods, including structured analysis by use of an event-and cause-diagram, change analysis by describing how events have deviated from earlier events or common practice, and barrier analysis by identifying technological and administrative barriers which have failed or are missing. The results are categorized into technical failures, human failures, organizational failures, as well as a combination of failures. The main finding is that the majority of the accidents are caused by the combination of technical, human and organizational failures. Critical root causes, results of change analysis and barrier analysis, and combination of failures are focused on in the discussion. Recommendations of potential safety improvements are made on the aspects of the assessment of the actual system function, barrier management for marine systems, risk information to support different decision-makings, and the development of an on-line risk monitoring and decision supporting system.

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