Sources and Literature Index life in the thirteenth century, it became possible to compare Aristotle's insights with the Augustinian and Christian views of human action. Aristotle prevailed in this comparison to an astonishing extent, but there were also Augustinian and Franciscan critics who did not adopt the Aristotelian view of human action. In addition, new views of action theory emerged in fourteenth-century scholasticism. Although these nominally followed Aristotle and, in some cases, Augustine, they introduced new ways of understanding human action. The discussion of akrasia provided a conceptual laboratory in which new ideas could be tested and their implications spelled out. 5 The richness of medieval philosophy has been discussed in many specialized studies. The results of this discussion have found their way into the more general historical presentations of akrasia. 6 This interest has not, however, extended to the early modern period. The standard work on philosophical terminology, Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, claims, immediately after its elaborate discussion of the medieval period, that 'weakness of will has not been a relevant concept or problem for the philosophy of the modern era. It only begins to be discussed again in the analytic philosophy'. 7 Given that many recent studies deal with akrasia in the writings of Descartes, Spinoza, Locke, Leibniz, and even Kant, this is a suprising statement. 8 It may, however, contain a grain of truth. In order to find a discussion on 'weakness of will' in these philosophers, the interpreter must define akrasia in broad terms; for instance, as general irrationality in human behaviour. One may doubt whether the non-Aristotelian philosophers of the modern era really are discussing Aristotle's problem. As their conceptual framework appears to be a different one, they may not be discussing akrasia but other problems of irrationality in human action. When Justin Gosling writes that 'between the Middle Ages and the twentieth century… interest in these problems [of akrasia] vanishes', 9 he means that Aristotle's questions no longer appeared as genuine philosophical problems after the decline of medieval Aristotelianism.My earlier study investigated Augustine's treatment of the so-called 'reluctant actions' (invitus facere) in addition to Aristotle's discussion. While that study focused on the medieval commentaries on Aristotle's EN, it also paid attention to the reception history of Augustine's views, claiming that his discussion deals with similar, although not identical, problems of 'weakness of will'. The present study follows the same