Psychology's dilemma: An institutional neurosis?

Abstract

The term psychology refers both to an institutional discipline and to a subject matter. Henriques, in his article "Psychology Defined" (this issue, pp. 1207-1221), emphasizes the second reference, and its focus can be sharpened by taking into account the first reference. On the one hand, epistemic progress in science is a dynamic process, which, as often as not, cuts across institutional divisions. However, on the other hand there are some problems of disunity that solely concern the institution. That the latter falls within the scope of the Tree of Knowledge is illustrated in how Keywords: Tree of Knowledge; theory construction; sociology of science Henriques (this issue, pp. 1207-1221) suggests that "many of the problems that plague psychology are epistemological in nature" (this issue, p. 1209). Perhaps, but I wonder if the problems so identified are the epistemological ones that the Tree of Knowledge (ToK) System hopes to solve. There are a number of problems in psychology and efforts toward disciplinary unification have not necessarily diagnosed all of their proper causes (Katzko, 2002). Auguste Comte developed a similar ToK and is credited with "inventing" sociology as a discipline, although he neither invented nor discovered the related phenomena. In contrast, one meaning of the term psychology is a social organization that already exists. Henriques recognizes this in the first paragraph of his article, and would do well to follow up on some of the implications of this fact. At minimum, a better delineation between psychology as an institution and psychology as a subject matter is required (Richards, 2002). The consequence of not recognizing the explicit social structure of scientific activity will confound problems concerning institutional functioning with problems concerning epistemological content-the "subject matter" under investigation.The discipline of psychology has been seriously constrained in its activities by an unrealistic picture of how science works in other disciplines. This is manifest in how

Toward a useful mass movement

“…Katzko (2004) offers an important call to "elevate the 'process of justification' to the status of a phenomenon for study" through the lens of "an informed curiosity" (p. 1239). In other words, researchers are encouraged to develop methodologies that explore new frontiers in answering the question of how people justify their behavioral investments.…”

“…He argued that my comments regarding the American Psychological Association indicated that I had "confused" problems of the institution with problems of science. Katzko (2004) also emphasized the distinction between the institution of psychology and its subject matter. In a similar vein, Yanchar (2004) saw my proposal as pursing unity per se, which presumably would be about the institution, rather than truth, which would be related to the subject matter.…”

“…Katzko (2004) commented on the problems that have arisen when institutions in American psychology have dictated how scientific problems are perceived and approached. Stam (2004) saw my proposal not as an act of science, but as a "disciplinary maneuver" (p. 1259).…”

Unifying Psychology: Shared Ontology and the Continuum of Practical Assumptions

“…Despite receiving some critical support for the wide sphere of potential insights it affords (Gilbert, 2004; Haaga, 2004; Katzko, 2004; Shealy, 2005; Stanovich, 2004), the Justification Hypothesis serves as an illustrative example of a recent theory built upon new practical assumptions. Although it is perhaps possible that all of human culture may be best understood as justification systems, constrained and operated by particular psychological mechanisms, counterarguments against such a complete account are already emerging.…”

“…Both Katzko (2008) and Shaffer (2008), for instance, argue that several social-phenomena require mind-culture bridgings that exceed the projected theoretical role of the Justification Hypothesis. Others, notably Vazire and Robins (2004), argue that the obvious utility of the Justification Hypothesis may be better understood as the result of several distinct adaptations, each with an alternative set of evolutionary origins to those proposed by Henriques (see also Katzko, 2004; Shealy, 2005; Stanovich, 2004). Regardless of which perspective ultimately triumphs, exploring the Justification Hypothesis as an example exposes the value of tentative practical assumptions that the present authors wish to draw attention to.…”